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A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO BOTH RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN MEDICAL TREATMENTS AND IMPROPER 
PHYSICIANS’ INFORMED CONSENT DISCLOSURES 
LARRY J. PITTMAN* 
I.  Introduction 
On September 11, 2001, supporters of Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist 
organization hijacked four domestic airplanes, flying two of them into the 
World Trade Center Towers in New York City, one of them into the Pentagon, 
and crashing the last one in rural Pennsylvania while likely en route to the 
White House, thereby killing approximately three thousand innocent American 
citizens in what was surely the most heinous act of foreign terrorism ever to 
occur on American soil.1  Subsequently, innocent Americans in Washington, 
D.C., New York, and New Jersey received letters containing anthrax, a 
poisonous chemical that infected and killed several of the recipients and caused 
great fear that more Americans would be infected with and die from anthrax, 
small pox, and whatever other means of mass destruction that terrorists may 
obtain for the purpose of inflicting great pain and fear upon the American 
public.2 
Following these unprecedented evil acts, the President properly instituted a 
war against Bin Laden, his terrorist network, and the Taliban rulers of 
Afghanistan.3  After months of the devastating bombing of Afghanistan, 
American ground troops entered Afghanistan and defeated some of the terrorist 
groups.4  If estimates are correct, African-American soldiers comprised 
approximately thirty percent of the soldiers who fought in Afghanistan.5  
Probably, the same percentage of African-American soldiers will fight in every 
other country into which America chases the terrorists who are responsible for 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. 
 1. See Roger Simon, Blown Away, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 14, 2001, at 16, 18, 
23. 
 2. Scott Shane, A Year Later, Clues on Anthrax Still Few, BALT. SUN, Oct. 9, 2002, at 1A. 
 3. Roger Simon, One Year, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 16, 2002, at 16, 20. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Muhammad Larry, Love of Freedom, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 17, 2002, at 1H. 
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the heinous attacks, despite the fact that African Americans comprise only 
approximately twelve percent of the American population.6 
At some point, the war on terrorism will be over, and white American 
soldiers will return to America and continue their normal lives.  African-
American soldiers, however, can only hope that history does not repeat itself 
regarding their unequal treatment in America.  For example, African-American 
soldiers, after having fought in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, 
and the Vietnam War to protect and preserve foreign peoples’ rights, returned 
to America where they found few civil rights, little humanity, and not much 
dignity.  African-American soldiers came home to a country where white 
citizens denied them the right to eat in integrated restaurants, sleep in 
integrated hotels, live in integrated residential areas, and receive integrated 
medical treatment in quality medical institutions.7 
Now, almost sixty years after World War II and approximately thirty years 
after the Vietnam War, many things have changed as African Americans (of all 
professions, including soldiers) can live, eat, and sleep in almost any place that 
they can afford.  However, there still is much racial discrimination in 
America.8  This statement appears to be especially true concerning access to 
health care, as shown by the substantial racial disparities that occur across a 
broad spectrum of medical treatments, even when many African Americans 
now have access to the financial resources that are necessary to pay for their 
medical treatments.9  For example, there are estimates that approximately sixty 
thousand (60,000) African Americans die annually because of the disparities 
between the types of medical treatments that physicians and other medical 
providers make available to African-American patients and to white patients.10  
 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., id.  As a matter of fact, African Americans have fought in every war in which 
America has been involved since the American Revolution; however, America did not give 
African-American soldiers the same treatment as white soldiers until President Harry Truman’s 
administration mandated the equal treatment of soldiers by the military while the soldiers were on 
active duty.  Equal treatment while in active service, however, did not prevent the American 
civilian population in the South and in some Northern states from discriminating against African-
American soldiers while they were either on leave or after they left military service.  See id. 
 8. See e.g., Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and 
Divergence Racing American Foreign Policy, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 260 (2000).  Gordon 
states: 
Although race continues to pervade all aspects of American life, albeit in constantly 
evolving, intricate and multidimensional ways, the racialized nature of our culture, our 
political institutions, our social relationships, indeed the racialized nature of our very 
being, has become imperceptible to the majority. White supremacy and white privilege 
are now recognized for the most part only by those who suffer its consequences. 
Id. at 264. 
 9. See infra notes 11–81 and accompanying text. 
 10. Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the Health Care System 
Ain’t Always Easy! An African American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
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Given the substantial disparities in various types of medical treatments, there is 
presently a debate over whether racism is at least one of the causes of this 
health care dilemma.  This Article adds to that debate. 
Part II discusses several studies that show racial disparities in such medical 
procedures as invasive heart treatments, cancer treatments, kidney transplants, 
and other medical treatments and procedures, with the outcome that physicians 
are giving white patients some beneficial treatments that these same physicians 
are not giving to African Americans and other minorities.  There is an 
indication that these disparities are leading to approximately 60,000 deaths in 
African-American patients—deaths that could be avoided if the disparities in 
treatments did not exist.  Sadly, the above-referenced studies implicate 
physicians’ racism as being at least one possible cause of the racial disparities.  
Part III examines the creation and continuation of the black inferiority theory 
and shows the harmful effects that it has had on many aspects of African 
Americans’ lives, especially its effect on the quality of medical treatments that 
white physicians provide to African-American patients. 
Part IV offers a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment as one 
possible means of alleviating some of the racial disparities in medical 
treatments.  Implicitly, this section argues that slavery and subsequent racism 
in America have been based upon the alleged black inferiority theory.  In the 
medical profession, physicians, both consciously and unconsciously, used the 
black inferiority theory to support historical and present racial discrimination 
against their African-American patients.  Therefore, the Thirteenth 
Amendment should outlaw any racial discrimination by physicians as a “badge 
and incident” of slavery if such racism is based upon the same black inferiority 
theory that supported and justified slavery. 
This section also outlines the burden of proof for such a direct Thirteenth 
Amendment claim.  Primarily, if African-American or other minority patients 
can show that they were denied medical treatment that their treating physician 
disproportionately provided to white patients, the burdens of production and 
persuasion would shift to the physician to show: (1) that the giving of the 
different or lesser treatment to minority patients served a compelling state or 
legitimate private interest; (2) that the practice was narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of the asserted interest, and (3) that there were no less restrictive 
alternatives to achieve the asserted interest.  Pure racism for its own sake, no 
 
191, 206 (1996).  Given the devastating effects of racial discrimination in the health care industry, 
this Article proposes that the Supreme Court of the United States establish a direct claim under 
the Thirteenth Amendment for physicians’ and other medical providers’ racial discrimination 
against African Americans and other minority patients.  See infra notes 205–211 and 
accompanying text (analyzing the legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment and the type of 
“dynamic interpretation” of the Amendment that the Court can use to create a direct claim under 
the Amendment). 
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matter how it is spun or packaged, should never be allowed to satisfy the 
above-referenced test. 
Part V argues that the informed consent doctrine should be altered to 
mandate that physicians, as a part of their informed consent disclosures, tell 
African Americans and other minorities that there is a disparity between the 
types of treatments that physicians have historically recommended for them 
and the treatments that physicians have recommended for white patients.  
Physicians should also explain in sufficient detail the reasons for the disparities 
in recommendations and treatments, thus allowing minority patients an 
opportunity to take actions to avoid any harm that might flow to them from the 
disparities, including seeking treatment from another physician.  This section 
also concludes that the failure to give the proposed informed consent 
disclosure would violate the Thirteenth Amendment. 
II.  ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN MEDICAL 
TREATMENTS 
Of all of the body’s organs, the heart is one of the most important.  This 
assertion is especially true given that heart disease is the leading cause of death 
in American women.11  Therefore, the medical profession and society in 
general should have a considerable interest in providing heart disease 
treatments on a nondiscriminatory basis.  A substantial body of medical studies 
show, however, that physicians do not give African-American heart patients 
the same types of treatments that they give to their white patients. 
For example, a study reported in 1993 examined the medical records of 
approximately 800,000 veterans12 to determine the frequency of invasive 
surgical procedures such as “cardiac catheterization, percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty, or coronary artery bypass grafting” and concluded that 
“[e]ven when financial incentives are absent, whites are more likely than 
blacks to undergo invasive cardiac procedures.”13  These researchers 
concluded, “We believe that inadequate health education, differences in 
patients’ preferences for invasive management, delivery systems that are 
unfriendly to members of certain cultures, and overt racism may all play a 
 
 11. Dyann Matson Koffman et al., An Evaluation of Choose to Move 1999: An American 
Heart Association Physical Activity Program for Women, 161 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 
2193, 2193 (2001). 
 12. Jeff Whittle et al., Racial Differences in the Use of Invasive Cardiovascular Procedures 
in the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical System, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 621, 622 (1993).  
The study considered white and African-American male patients who sought treatment at 
Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals throughout America from 1987 through 1991.  Id. at 621. 
 13. Id.  The differences were statistically significant.  The article noted that white veterans 
were 1.38 times more likely than African-American veterans to undergo cardiac catheterization, 
one and a half times more likely to undergo angioplasty, and more than two times more likely to 
undergo coronary artery bypass surgery.  Id. 
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part.”14  Consistently, other studies have shown racial disparities in various 
types of heart treatments that are probably caused, in part, by physicians’ 
racism.15  Also, in a recent report by the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), 
entitled Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Health Care,16 a committee reviewed more than one hundred studies and gave 
its opinions, stating: 
The preponderance of studies, however, find that even after adjustment for 
many potentially confounding factors—including racial differences in access 
to care, disease severity, site of care (e.g., geographic variation or type of 
hospital or clinic), disease prevalence, comorbidities or clinical characteristics, 
refusal rates, and overuse of services by whites—racial and ethnic disparities 
in cardiovascular care remain.17 
 
 14. Id. at 626.  More importantly, this study shows that patients’ incomes were not a 
controlling factor in causing the disparity in medical treatments because the patients received free 
treatments at VA hospitals.  See id. at 621. 
 15. See generally Joseph Conigliaro et al., Understanding Racial Variation in the Use of 
Coronary Revascularization Procedures: The Role of Clinical Factors, 160 ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MED. 1329 (2000); Edward L. Hannan et al., Access to Coronary Artery Bypass 
Surgery by Race/Ethnicity and Gender Among Patients Who Are Appropriate for Surgery, 37 
MED. CARE 68 (1999); Eric D. Peterson et al., Racial Variation in Cardiac Procedure Use and 
Survival Following Acute Myocardial Infraction in the Department of Veterans Affairs, 271 
JAMA 1175 (1994). 
  A 1999 study concluded that “the race and sex of the patient affected the physicians’ 
decisions about whether to refer patients with chest pain for cardiac catheterization, even after . . . 
adjust[ment] for symptoms, the physicians’ estimates of the probability of coronary disease, and 
clinical characteristics.”  Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians’ 
Recommendations for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 623 (1999). These 
researchers asserted that some of the disparity in treatment might be caused either by a 
physician’s overt or subconscious biased attitudes.  Id. at 624-25.  The researchers further stated: 
However, our study could not assess the form of bias.  Bias may represent overt prejudice 
on the part of physicians or, more likely, could be the result of subconscious perceptions 
rather than deliberate actions or thoughts.  Subconscious bias occurs when a patient’s 
membership in a target group automatically activates a cultural stereotype in the 
physician’s memory regardless of the level of prejudice the physician has. 
Id. (endnotes omitted).  The researchers concluded that the racial disparities in the physicians’ 
referrals for cardiac catheterization “suggest that decision making by physicians may be an 
important factor in explaining differences in the treatment of cardiovascular disease with respect 
to race and sex.”  Id. at 625. 
 16. COMMITTEE ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES 
IN HEALTH CARE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al., eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
UNEQUAL TREATMENT]. 
 17. Id. at 42.  For a list of the medical studies concerning cardiovascular disease that the 
committee reviewed, see id. app. B–1 at 306-25 (Literature Review). 
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This committee found that “research suggests that healthcare providers’ 
diagnostic and treatment decisions, as well as their feelings about patients, are 
influenced by patients’ race or ethnicity.”18 
 
 18. Id. at 11.  In light of the above-discussed studies, including the Institute of Medicine 
report, at least one question arises.  If racism is a cause of the racial disparity in medical 
treatments, one might expect that the race of the treating physicians would have a bearing on the 
types of procedures that African Americans undergo.  But a May 2001 study made an interesting 
observation: “Black patients had lower rates of cardiac catheterization than white patients, 
regardless of whether their attending physician was white (rate of catheterization, 38.4  percent 
vs. 45.7 percent . . .) or black (38.2 percent vs.  49.6 percent . . . ).”  Jersey Chen et al., Racial 
Differences in the Use of Cardiac Catheterization After Acute Myocardial Infarction, 344 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1443, 1443 (2001). 
  Though Chen’s conclusion may be more indicative of the absence of overt racism, it 
does not foreclose the possibility that some white physicians and some African-American 
physicians might be motivated by unconscious racism when they treat African-American patients, 
as some commentators have recognized: 
[B]oth white and black physicians may have subtle biases that are based on other social 
factors and that influence their judgments about patients’ suitability for procedures.  For 
example, previous research has documented difficulties in communication about cardiac 
testing between physicians and patients of lower socioeconomic status, and physicians 
report personal perceptions of less affluent or less well educated patients that are more 
negative than their perceptions of other patients.  Black patients are disproportionately 
represented in these socioeconomic groups. 
Arnold M. Epstein & John Z. Ayanian, Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 344 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1471, 1472 (2001) (endnotes omitted). 
  This observation is consistent with my beliefs that the black inferiority theory has 
infected both white people and African Americans such that both races, and all other races and 
ethnic groups, have a tendency to treat African Americans differently, frequently to African 
Americans’ detriment.  Therefore, before one uses the Chen study to exclude racism as one of the 
causes of the racial disparity in medical treatments, he or she should consider the insidious nature 
of racism and the effects that it has had, and is having, on the psyche of Americans of all colors 
and races.  See Frank M. McClellan, Is Managed Care Good For What Ails You? Ruminations on 
Race, Age and Class, 44 VILL. L. REV. 227, 246 (1999).  The author noted that “[b]lack 
professionals did not see the Tuskegee Study as a threat to their families or friends.  Somehow, 
despite the commonality of race, the physicians were able to separate themselves from the victims 
and see them as the ‘the other.’”.  Id. 
  Additionally, because of the existence of racial disparities in medical treatments, one can 
reasonably expect that African Americans and other minorities have suffered injuries from the 
different treatments that they have received.  One study asserted that African Americans’ 
mortality rates and rates of future recurrent ischemic events were similar to the rates of white 
patients who received more angiography, intensive anti-ischemic medication, and 
revascularization procedures.  Peter H. Stone et al., Influence of Race, Sex, and Age on 
Management of Unstable Angina and Non-Q-Wave Myocardial Infarction: The TIMI III Registry, 
275 JAMA 1104, 1108 (1996).  This conclusion tends to show that the racial disparity in 
treatments did not worsen African Americans’ mortality rates.  See id. 
  However, even if the Stone study showing no effect on African Americans’ mortality 
rates is accurate, such a conclusion would not alleviate the possibility that African-American 
patients might have received other health benefits (such as an improved quality of life) had they 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 137 
As with heart treatments, racial disparities exist for cancer treatments.  For 
example, physicians do not offer their African-American patients surgeries for 
early-stage resectable non-small-cell lung cancer (stage I or II) as frequently as 
they offer such treatments to their white patients, even though that surgery is 
very effective in curing such cancer.19  Additionally, the above-referenced 
IOM report made several observations about racial disparities in cancer 
treatments.  First, African-American women with breast cancer received fewer 
 
received the same rate of heart treatments as white patients.  For example, the IOM committee 
stated: 
In addition, a finding of no racial or ethnic differences in patient outcomes (e.g., survival) 
despite disparate rates of treatment should not be interpreted as demonstrating that 
disparities in the use of medical intervention are inconsequential.  In such instances, 
researchers should ask whether equivalent rates of intervention might be associated with 
better patient outcomes among minorities. 
UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 52-53. 
  And, in contrast to Stone’s study, a Duke University Medical Center study of 12,402 
patients found that because African-American patients received fewer bypass surgeries and 
angioplasties than whites, they experienced “lower rates of survival for five years” given that 
African Americans were “18 percent more likely to die than whites during the five years of 
follow-up.”  Eric D. Peterson et al., Racial Variation in the Use of Coronary-Revascularization 
Procedures—Are the Differences Real? Do They Matter?, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED 480, 484 
(1997).  The disparity in treatment was not caused by the medical or other clinical conditions of 
the patients.  Id.  This study indicates that the longer African Americans live after heart 
treatments, the more likely the racial disparity will have a negative impact on their mortality rates.  
Id. at 484. 
 19. See Peter B. Bach et al., Racial Differences in the Treatment of Early-Stage Lung 
Cancer, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1198, 1198 (1999).  The study consisted of 860 African 
Americans and 10,124 white Americans 65 and older with Medicare payments for their medical 
treatments.  Id. at 1200.  The researchers found that “[t]he rate of surgery was 12.7 percentage 
points lower for black patients than for white patients (64.0 percent vs. 76.7 percent . . .), and the 
five-year survival rate was also lower for blacks (26.4 percent vs. 34.1 percent . . .).”  Id. at 1198.  
The survival rate was similar for African Americans and white Americans who underwent 
surgery and for members of both groups who did not undergo surgery.  Id.  The researchers 
concluded that the lower rate of surgery for African-American patients explains the lower 
survival rates for African Americans who had “early-stage, non-small-cell lung cancer.”  Id.  
Instead of focusing on African-American patients’ preferences, the Bach study concluded that 
“[a]n alternative explanation is that black patients are offered optimal treatment less frequently 
than their white counterparts.”  Id. at 1204.  This study at least suggests that the race of the 
African-American patients had something to do with physicians’ not recommending surgery to 
them, given that the researchers controlled the study for socioeconomic conditions and other 
illnesses.  See id. at 1201-02. 
  The Bach study is very disturbing given that surgery is very effective in curing and in 
increasing the survival rates of patients with “early-stage, non-small-cell lung cancer.”  See id. at 
1204.  The fact that African Americans underwent surgery less frequently than white Americans 
(and suffered an increase in mortality rates because of the failure to have the surgery) is 
especially troubling.  This disparity becomes even more problematic if physicians’ failure to 
recommend surgical intervention is both a substantial factor in African Americans’ failure to 
undergo surgery and is because of physicians’ racially biased attitudes.  See id. at 1204. 
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“progesterone receptor assays . . . , were less likely to receive radiation therapy 
in combination with radical/modified mastectomy, and were less likely to 
receive rehabilitation support services following mastectomy.”20  Second, 
African-American men, at all ages studied, received fewer “radical 
prostatectomy and radiation to treat prostate cancer.”21  Third, African 
Americans “received less effective diagnostic evaluations” for colon cancer.22  
Fourth, African-American cancer patients received less “post-treatment 
surveillance care.”23  Fifth, “African-American women with invasive cervical 
cancer” were more likely than white women to have their physician not 
recommend treatment of the disease.24  Sixth, African-American men with 
colorectal non metastasis cancer were “41% less likely than whites to receive a 
major procedure for treatment” of their cancer, while those with metastasis 
cancer were “27% less likely to receive a major treatment.”25 
The IOM report made observations about disparities in other treatments as 
well.  For instance, African-American patients received less pain medication to 
treat their medical condition in nursing homes, and they had “a 63% greater 
probability of being untreated for pain relative to whites.”26  Also, African 
Americans who received their medical treatments in medical facilities that 
primarily treat minority patients received less pain medication than white 
patients who received their treatments in facilities that primarily treat white 
patients.27  Finally, in certain veteran administration hospitals, African-
American patients were less likely to have surgery than white patients who had 
“esophageal adenocarcinoma.”28 
Consistent with the above-referenced types of cancer treatments, there is a 
racial disparity regarding African-American breast cancer patients, as the 
mortality rates for African-American females is higher than the rates for white 
females.29  Some researchers blame physicians for that disparity because a 
 
 20. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 53. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 54. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 55. 
 26. Id. at 55-56. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. at 57. 
 29. Donald R. Lannin et al., Influence of Socioeconomic and Cultural Factors on Racial 
Differences in Late-Stage Presentation of Breast Cancer, 279 JAMA 1801, 1801 (1998).  Some 
researchers believe that, as an effort to promote earlier diagnosis of breast cancer in African-
American women, physicians should become better informed of the cultural and religious beliefs 
of such patients and use that information to better inform African-American breast cancer patients 
of the risks and benefits of various medical treatments.  See id. at 1807. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 139 
physician’s recommendation of a screening mammography is the major factor 
that influences a woman’s decision to undergo the procedure.30 
There is also a racial disparity in kidney transplants.  A study published in 
1999 arranged for the interviews of 1,392 patients (384 African-American 
women, 354 white women, 337 African-American men, and 317 white men) 
who had a diagnosis of “end-stage renal disease,” with the study being 
controlled to alleviate effects from differences in socioeconomic and 
demographic backgrounds, other illnesses, patients’ preferences, “expectations 
about transplantation,” “perceptions of care,” and “type of dialysis facility.”31  
The researchers concluded: 
  Among patients who wanted a transplant, blacks remained significantly 
less likely than whites to have been referred for evaluation and significantly 
less likely to have been placed on a waiting list or to have received a transplant 
within 18 months after the start of dialysis therapy . . . .  Even among the 
patients who said they were very certain that they wanted a transplant, blacks 
were substantially less likely than whites to have been referred for evaluation 
(62.8 percent of black women vs. 83.6 percent of white women, and 62.0 
percent of black men vs. 83.2 percent of white men . . .) and were substantially 
less likely to have been placed on a waiting list or to have received a transplant 
within 18 months after the start of dialysis therapy (44.2 percent vs. 71.4 
percent and 45.4 percent vs. 70.8 percent, respectively . . .).32 
These researchers found that patients’ preferences “explained only a small part 
of the racial differences in rates of referral and of placement on a waiting list 
for transplantation” and that “[r]acial differences in access to transplantation 
remained significant after adjustment for sociodemographic factors, health 
status, perceptions of care, and coexisting illnesses.”33 
 
 30. Michael S. O’Malley et al., Race and Mammography Use in Two North Carolina 
Counties, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 782, 785 (1997). 
 31. John Z. Ayanian et al., The Effect of Patients’ Preferences on Racial Differences in 
Access to Renal Transplantation, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1661, 1661 (1999). 
 32. Id. at 1663-64. 
 33. Id. at 1667.  These researchers cautiously stopped short of stating that racial 
discrimination was the cause of the disparity of treatment: 
Although few patients reported recent discrimination on the basis of their race, income, or 
sex, we believe blacks may be more likely than whites to encounter problems in 
communicating with their physicians and may have less trust in the health care system, as 
suggested by our data and the preliminary results of one qualitative study. 
Id. (endnotes omitted). 
  However, it is not surprising that the African-American patients did not complain about 
physicians’ racial discrimination, given that a substantial amount of discrimination is covert and 
therefore difficult to discover.  See generally Barbara A. Noah, The Invisible Patient, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 121 (2002) (book review).  Even if there were a communication problem between 
white physicians and their African-American patients (to a greater degree than with their white 
patients), the existence of such a difference in patients’ communications with their white 
physicians would be some indication of racism, for it is not reasonable to believe that African 
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A subsequent study based upon the same data as the above-discussed 
kidney transplant research concluded: 
Black patients were less likely than white patients to be rated as appropriate 
candidates for transplantation according to appropriateness criteria based on 
expert opinion (71 blacks [9.0 percent] vs. 152 whites [20.9 percent]) and were 
more likely to have had incomplete evaluations (368 [46.5 percent] vs. 282 
[38.8 percent] . . .).  Among patients considered to be appropriate candidates 
for transplantation, blacks were less likely than whites to be referred for 
evaluation, according to the chart review (90.1 percent vs. 98.0 percent . . .), to 
be placed on a waiting list (71.0 percent vs. 86.7 percent . . .), or to undergo 
transplantation (16.9 percent vs. 52.0 percent . . .).  Among patients classified 
as inappropriate candidates, whites were more likely than blacks to be referred 
for evaluation (57.8 percent vs. 38.4 percent), to be placed on a waiting list 
(30.9 percent vs. 17.4 percent), and to undergo transplantation (10.3 percent 
vs. 2.2 percent . . .).34 
These researchers concluded that such factors as the differences in clinical 
characteristics, the underuse of transplantation among blacks, and the overuse 
among whites caused the racial differences in the rates of kidney transplants.35  
Interestingly, the researchers found that there was an underuse of kidney 
transplants by African Americans and an over-use by white Americans even 
when a transplant was deemed inappropriate.36  This pattern of underuse of 
transplants by African Americans, regardless of their medical suitability, is 
suggestive of racial discrimination against African Americans.37  This 
conclusion is especially warranted because the racial disparity in kidney 
 
Americans have a more difficult time in understanding their physicians’ discussions on the 
advantages and disadvantages of a treatment like a kidney transplant, regardless of their 
educational levels, if physicians really make a genuine effort to communicate the benefits and 
risks of the various types of kidney treatments. 
  It is only reasonable to believe that any difficulty that some African Americans have, in 
their communication abilities or in their abilities to understand physicians’ statements, can be 
alleviated if physicians better inform themselves about the limitations of their patients’ 
communication abilities and if they assert a little more effort in making certain that their patients 
understand information about the benefits and risks of recommended treatments.  See O’Malley, 
supra note 30, at 785.  In any event, no one should use some African Americans’ alleged 
communication problems as an excuse for the racial disparities in various medical treatments. 
 34. Arnold M. Epstein et al., Racial Disparities in Access to Renal Transplantation: 
Clinically Appropriate or Due to Underuse or Overuse?, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1537, 1537 
(2000). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1540-42. 
 37. African-American patients’ preferences do not explain all of the disparities in medical 
treatments.  See UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 7.  This statement is especially true 
given that African Americans’ preferences for or against kidney transplants do not cause much of 
the disparity in kidney transplants.  See Ayanian et al., supra note 31, at 1663-64. 
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transplants exists even when adjustments are made for “sociodemographic 
characteristics and health status.”38 
Some researchers have concluded that an analysis should be made into 
each of the four steps of the kidney transplant process to determine whether 
there are barriers at each step that contribute to the racial disparity in kidney 
transplants.39  Because African Americans encounter difficulties and barriers at 
each step, researchers should study African Americans’ interaction and 
communication with their white treating physicians.40  In other words, white 
physicians’ conscious or unconscious racial prejudices might be influencing 
their evaluation of African-American patients and their recommendations of 
kidney transplants for such patients. 
In addition to physicians’ probable racial bias against African Americans, 
the federal government’s insensitivity to the disproportionate impact that its 
kidney transplant criteria have on African Americans might also be one of the 
 
 38. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 59.  Other studies, as reviewed by the above-
referenced Institute of Medicine review committee, show the racial disparities in kidney 
transplants.  For example, studies show that African Americans “are less likely than similar white 
patients to receive a kidney transplant,” and are “less likely than white patients to be referred for 
transplantation and to appear on waiting lists within the first year of Medicare eligibility.” Id. at 
58 (citations omitted).  African Americans are also “less likely to be judged as appropriate for 
transplantation, are less likely to appear on transplantation waiting lists, and are less likely to 
undergo transplantation procedures, even after patients’ insurance status and other factors are 
considered.”  Id. at 58-59. 
  It is not reasonable to believe that African Americans, if given appropriate informed 
consent, would disproportionately forgo kidney transplants, especially because studies have 
shown that, even when African Americans want transplants, there is a racial disparity between 
them and white patients.  See Ayanian et al., supra note 31, at 1663-64. 
 39. See generally G. Caleb Alexander, Barriers to Cadaveric Renal Transplantation Among 
Blacks, Women, and the Poor, 280 JAMA 1148 (1998).  These steps are: “(A) being medically 
suitable and possibly interested in transplantation, (B) being definitely interested in 
transplantation, (C) completing the pretransplant workup, and (D) moving up a waiting list and 
receiving a transplant.”  Id. at 1151.  These researchers found that for African Americans, “[s]teps 
B through D are the most important impediments.”  Id. 
 40. See id.  For example, at step C, the pretransplant workup, the researchers noted that tasks 
performed at that step “may include referral to transplant surgeons, evaluation and treatment of 
medical conditions, and laboratory studies such as tissue typing.”  Id. at 1151.  These are tasks 
that treating physicians can influence.  See id.  For the most part, African-American patients’ 
medical conditions did not warrant that they stay in step C.  See id.  The research noted that only 
three percent of the patients who did not complete step C were deemed “‘not a transplant 
candidate’ or ‘undecided.’”  Id.  The researchers theorized and speculated that the following 
might be reasons why African Americans do not make it out of step C: “biological and medical 
variables, lack of knowledge about transplantation, and concerns about surgery, adverse effects of 
medication, and health care costs.  Possible provider factors include subconscious bias and 
financial disincentives.  Transplant center size and proximity, as well as regional variations in 
matching algorithms, may also play a role.”  Id. (endnotes omitted).  An understanding of how the 
above possible factors affect African Americans and others at each step of the kidney transplant 
process may help reduce the racial disparities in kidney transplants.  Id. 
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causes of the racial disparity.  For example, the National Organ Transplant 
Act41 and the federal regulations thereunder give organ transplant priority to 
those patients who have either a zero mismatch (of six antigens) with the 
kidney donor or who have the fewest mismatches.42  Because antigens appear 
differently in African Americans than in white people, white people are more 
likely to have a zero mismatch for an available kidney because more white 
people donate kidneys than African Americans, a result that is mostly because 
of the make-up of the American population.43  Therefore, because of the 
federal government’s antigen match allocation system, white people will 
disproportionately receive more kidney transplants than African Americans.44 
This conclusion is unsettling given that there may be other criteria that 
could be used to allocate kidneys.45  There is some evidence that a program for 
kidney transplants that is not primarily based upon the matching of antigens 
can be established through the use of drugs that minimize the risk of a 
transplant rejection.46  In other words, there is evidence that a patient who has 
some antigen mismatch, but who is neither a zero mismatch nor a six 
mismatch, has only a small percentage increase in the risk of rejection 
compared to others who have less than a zero mismatch.47  If this evidence is 
accurate, the federal government’s present use of the antigen-match system is 
 
 41. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2000)). 
 42. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 76 (4th 
ed. 2001). 
 43. See id.  Presently, African Americans, who comprise approximate twelve percent of the 
population, donate approximately thirteen percent of the kidneys.  However, because more 
African Americans suffer from end stage renal disease, they need more kidneys than they donate.  
See id.  One commentator has stated that “to level off the zero antigen mismatch standard the 
donation rate for African-Americans would have to increase five times over the current rate for 
African-Americans and four times over the current rate for white donors.”  Id. at 77. 
 44. See generally Robert S. Gaston et al., Racial Equity in Renal Transplantation: The 
Disparate Impact of HLA-Based Allocation, 270 JAMA 1352 (1993) (discussing the racial 
disparity in kidney transplants that the federal antigen-matching allocation criterion causes).  This 
advantage for white Americans exists despite the fact that African Americans disproportionately 
have had more end-stage renal disease than white Americans and despite their frequently 
comprising a majority of the patients who are on the waiting list for kidney transplants.  FURROW 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 76 (asserting that white people “received 63% of donated kidneys 
between 1994 and 1998”). 
 45. See Gaston et al., supra note 44, at 1355. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 1354 (arguing for a change in the federal program such that kidneys will be 
allocated through a program that relies less on antigen matching).  See also FURROW ET AL., 
supra note 42, at 77 (asserting that “[d]ata from 1999 indicate graft one-year survival rates for 
cadaveric kidney transplants of 86.7% for mismatch of five antigens; 87.5% for four; 88.6% for 
three; 88.3% for two; and 90.1 when there is only one mismatch,” and asking the question: “Are 
these differences significant?”). 
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not justified given the disproportionate impact that it has on African 
Americans’ access to kidney transplants.48 
A reasonable conclusion from the above discussion is that white 
physicians’ racial prejudices and the federal government’s antigen matching 
system are the causes of that portion of the racial disparity in kidney 
transplants for African Americans that is not because of their preferences, 
health status, and socioeconomic status.49  Presently, African Americans 
encounter a racial disparity in kidney treatments from the beginning phases of 
end-stage renal disease until the conclusion of their treatments, including 
physicians’ referral for kidney transplant evaluations, patients’ placement on 
transplant waiting lists, and patients’ actual receipt of kidney transplants.50  
Clearly, some efforts should be taken to bring equity to the allocation of 
kidneys.51 
Not only are African Americans at a racial disadvantage when it comes to 
the above-described medical treatments, they also disproportionately receive 
less adequate treatment for pain.52  For example, African Americans receive 
inadequate doses of pain medication during emergency room treatments, 
 
 48. See infra notes 225–33 and accompanying text. 
 49. The racial disparity in kidney transplants is problematic because, although African 
Americans comprise approximately twelve percent of the United States population, they are 
approximately thirty-one percent of the patients with end-stage renal disease.  Gaston et al., supra 
note 44, at 1352; see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 42, at 76 (asserting that “end stage renal 
disease is much more prevalent among African-Americans, at nearly four times the rate of the 
white population”).  In 1997, the rate of kidney disease in African Americans was approximately 
four times the rate in white Americans.  Carlton J. Young et al., Renal Transplantation in Black 
Americans, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1545, 1545 (2000); see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 42, 
at 76 (asserting that “African-Americans [have end stage renal disease at] nearly four times the 
rate of the white population”).  High blood pressure may be one of the causes of the disease in 
African Americans.  See Young, supra (noting that “hypertension among blacks in America 
remains the highest of any subpopulation in the world”).  Apparently, some African Americans’ 
kidneys have a genetic disposition to retain salt, which along with their excessive consumption of 
salt, contributes to the cause of high blood pressure and “end-stage renal disease.”  See id.  Some 
researchers have linked this genetic disposition to the slave trade when African Americans were 
transported as slaves for long periods of time on ships without much water or salt.  As a result, 
more genetic pressure was exerted favoring survival of those equipped for the retention of salt.  
See Cara A. Fauci, Note, Racism and Health Care in America: Legal Responses to Racial 
Disparities in the Allocation of Kidneys, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 54 & n.183 (2001).  
When combined with a high consumption of salt, excessive retention of salt in the system causes 
high blood pressure and resulting kidney disease.  See id. at 54. 
 50. See id. at 54-56. 
 51. See infra text accompanying notes 225–33. 
 52. See generally Vence L. Bonham, Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Treatment: Striving to 
Understand the Causes and Solutions to the Disparities in Pain Treatment, 29 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 52 (2001) (discussing the possible reasons why minorities receive less treatment for pain, 
including race, ethnicity, language barriers, inadequate physician-patient communication, and 
socioeconomic position). 
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inadequate pain medication for long bone fractures,53 and inadequate treatment 
of pain after surgery.54  They also receive less “intensive care for pneumonia” 
and more C-sections to deliver their babies.55  Similarly, a racial disparity 
exists even in treatments like influenza vaccinations where there does not 
appear to be a substantial risk from the treatment.56  For African-American 
patients, physicians may not recommend or discuss the benefits and risks of 
influenza vaccinations to the same degree that they discuss such treatments 
with their white patients.57 
In addition, African-American patients, even when they are similarly 
situated as white patients (same preferences, insurance status, and health 
conditions), receive less medical treatments for HIV/AIDS infection.58  Also, 
at least one study shows that African Americans are less likely than white 
Americans to receive certain medications for the management of chronic 
asthma and have fewer referrals to specialists for asthmatic treatments.59  Other 
studies show that African-American patients receive different treatments for 
diabetes than white patients.60  One study shows that African-American elderly 
patients with hip fractures receive less physical and occupational therapy than 
similarly-situated white patients.61 
Consistent with the above discussion, African-American females receive 
fewer amniocentesis, fewer ultrasonography, and less tocolysis for treatment of 
plural births than white women.62  Similarly, physicians give less advice to 
single African-American female patients than to single white patients 
regarding the risks of taking drugs,63 smoking and drinking alcohol.64  African-
 
 53. See id. at 54 (citing Knox H. Todd et al., Ethnicity and Analgesic Practice, 35 ANNALS 
EMERG. MED. 11 (2000)). 
 54. See id. at 59 (citing Bernardo Ng et al., The Effect of Ethnicity on Prescriptions for 
Patient-Controlled Analgesia for Post-Operative Pain, PAIN, July 1996, at 9). 
 55. See generally Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming An Unjust Health 
Care System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127 (1993) (concluding 
that physicians’ racial discrimination is a primary cause of the racial disparity in such treatments). 
 56. Eric C. Schneider et al., Racial Disparity in Influenza Vaccination: Does Managed Care 
Narrow the Gap Between African Americans and Whites?, 286 JAMA 1455 (2001).  Importantly, 
patients’ preferences were not the “sole predictors of whether beneficiaries receive[d] 
vaccination.”  Id. at 1459. 
 57. See id. (asserting that one possible cause may be the “failure of clinicians to vaccinate 
minority patients during health care visits”).  Other than such apparent racism, there does not 
appear to be a real explanation for such a disparity in physicians’ informed consent disclosure 
regarding influenza vaccinations. 
 58. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 61-62. 
 59. See id. at 62-63. 
 60. See id. at 64. 
 61. See id. at 66. 
 62. See id. at 67.  African-American women receive less tocolysis care despite having plural 
births more frequently than white women.  See id. 
 63. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 67-68. 
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American children and Hispanic children receive less pain medication than 
white children.65  African-American mental health patients experience 
“striking disparities” in the provision of mental health services and therefore 
have less trust in and more fear of the mental health care profession.66 
As further evidence of racism, African Americans with glaucoma received 
approximately half of the expected “argon laser trabeculoplasty or 
trabeculectomy surgery,”67 and African Americans “who underwent 
cholecystectomy were less likely than white patients to undergo the 
laparoscopic procedure.”68  These racial disparities are consistent with other 
studies of the lengths of hospitalization that have shown that “African-
American patients had a shorter length of stay and lower resource use in the 
first seven days compared with white patients.”69  In fact, the only major 
treatments that African-American patients receive more of are the treatments 
that no one really wants, limb amputations for diabetes and bilateral 
orchiectomy—the surgical removal of a male’s testicles.70 
If the above discussion is not enough to show the substantial racial 
disparities in medical treatment, other examples can be found by reviewing the 
IOM report.71  Interestingly, despite the above-referenced studies (that are 
controlled for income, patients’ preferences, degree of illnesses, and for many 
other factors), some researchers and commentators are still hesitant to conclude 
that physicians’ racial discrimination is a cause of some of the racial disparities 
in medical treatments.72  However, given the complexity of medical treatments 
and the many factors—some of which are outside the patient’s expertise and 
knowledge—that influence the interaction between African-American patients 
and their white physicians, it seems only reasonable that legal scholars, 
attorneys, and courts should recognize a presumption of physicians’ racial 
discrimination. 
Even if one is hesitant about asserting physicians’ racism as a cause of the 
racial disparities, he or she should not have too much difficulty with a court’s 
recognition of a rebuttable presumption of physicians’ racial discrimination 
 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. at 68. 
 66. Id. at 69. 
 67. Id. at 71. 
 68. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note16, at 71. 
 69. Id. at 72. 
 70. See id. at 74 (citing various studies).  It appears that African Americans will receive 
more of a type of treatment than white patients only when the treatment is potentially harmful; for 
example, physicians give African Americans more antipsychotic medication than they give to 
white Americans.  But for anti-depression drugs, physicians give white Americans more of such 
drugs.  Id. at 70. 
 71. For discussion of other treatments, see id. at 71-74. 
 72. See generally Chen et al., supra note 18 (implying that the race of the treating physicians 
has no impact on the racial disparity between white and African-American patients). 
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when African-American and other minority patients receive less beneficial 
medical treatments than white patients.73  A presumption is especially 
necessary because without it, in most cases, it will be almost impossible to 
discover covert acts of racial discrimination.74  This conclusion is proper given 
the covert nature of present day discrimination and the vast opportunities, 
enhanced by the complexities of medical practice, that physicians have to hide 
their discrimination.75 
The above discussion, including its analysis of various studies, clearly 
shows that there is a substantial amount of racial disparity in medical 
treatments.76  There is uncertainty, however, regarding the causes of the 
disparity.77  Some commentators have noted that different patients have 
different preferences for certain types of treatments.78  It is doubtful that such 
differences in preferences are either the sole cause, or even a substantial cause, 
of the racial disparities in various types of medical treatments.79  For example, 
studies have shown that African Americans’ preferences against certain 
 
 73. Such a presumption, after an affected minority patient shows a prima facie case, would 
place the burden on physicians to explain why there is a disparity in the different types of 
treatments that the physicians give to their patients.  See also infra text accompanying notes 223–
33. 
 74. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).  “In many 
cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine and 
covert discrimination by the employer or union involved.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
 75. See generally Patricia A. King & Leslie E. Wolf, Empowering and Protecting Patients: 
Lessons for Physician-Assisted Suicide From the African-American Experience, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 1015 (1998) (asserting that disparity in treatment exists even when adjustments are made 
such that African Americans and whites have equal access to treatments; that all of the disparity 
cannot be attributed to African Americans’ preferences against certain medical treatments; and 
that physicians’ unconscious bias may be among the causes of some of the racial disparities in 
medical treatments); see also H. Jack Geiger, Race and Health Care—An American Dilemma?, 
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 815, 816 (1996) (noting that “if racism is involved it is unlikely to be 
overt or even conscious”). 
 76. Given the historical racism in the health care industry, it is also reasonable to believe that 
physicians’ racism is a contributing cause of some of the racial disparities in the health care 
industry. 
 77. See Bonham, supra note 52. 
 78. For example, African Americans in general may have less of a preference for coronary 
bypass surgery.  See Peterson et al., supra note 18, at 485 (asserting that African Americans are 
more likely to disagree with physicians’ opinion that bypass surgery is indicated); King & Wolf, 
supra note 75, at 1036 (stating that “the Coronary Artery Surgery Study found that whites were 
more likely than blacks to elect to have bypass surgery”).  African Americans with kidney disease 
also have less of a preference for kidney transplantation.  Ayanian et al., supra note 31, at 1661.  
However, these preferences “explain only a small fraction of the substantial racial differences in 
access to transplantation.”  Id. 
 79. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 7 (asserting that African-American patients’ 
preferences do not explain all of the disparity in medical treatments). 
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treatments are not the cause of much of the racial disparities in medical 
treatments.80  Also, to the extent that African Americans and other minorities 
have preferences against certain medical treatments, some of their choices 
against treatment might stem from fear of present racism (which might be 
based upon their knowledge of historical racial discrimination in the health 
care industry) and from physicians’ failure to inform such patients of the full 
range of their treatment options.81 
III.  PHYSICIANS’ AND OTHER MEDICAL PROVIDERS’ RACISM AS A POSSIBLE 
CAUSE OF THE RACIAL DISPARITIES IN MEDICAL TREATMENTS 
To the extent that physicians’ racism is a contributing cause of some of the 
racial disparities in medical treatments, the remaining portions of this Article 
offer a means of combating such discrimination.  To fully consider physicians’ 
and other providers’ present racial attitudes about their African-American 
patients, one should start with an analysis of the historical racism against 
African Americans.  The central theme is that racism, through the 
institutionalization of the black inferiority theory, has been passed down from 
one generation of white people to another and that the theory presently infects 
physicians’ and other medical providers’ judgment about the type of medical 
treatments that they should give to African Americans and other minorities. 
A. African Americans’ Status as an Alleged Racially Inferior Group 
Initially, some might be hesitant to presume that racism is at least one 
cause of the present racial disparities in medical treatment, but a brief review 
of the persistent existence and effects of racism in this country will show that 
such a presumption is within the bounds of reason.  No knowledgeable person 
can seriously doubt that for more than four centuries, many white Americans 
have considered African Americans to be of an inferior race—one suited for 
working jobs inferior to those held by whites, for living in places inferior to 
places where whites live, and for enjoying freedoms inferior to those that white 
Americans enjoy.82  This black inferiority theory dates back at least to the late 
 
 80. See id. 
 81. See generally Mark P. Doescher et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Perceptions of 
Physician Style and Trust, 9 ARCH. FAM. MED. 1156 (2000) (discussing African Americans’ and 
other minorities’ lack of trust in physicians).  A recent study of a “nationally representative 
sample” shows that African-American and other minority patients, when compared to white 
patients, “reported less positive perceptions of physicians than whites” on “the summary scales 
for satisfaction with physician style” and on the “trust in the physician” scale.  Id. at 1160. 
 82. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856), the United States 
Supreme Court stated that African Americans “were at that time considered as a subordinate and 
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but 
such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.”  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
148 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:131 
1500s when Europeans first came in contact with West Africans during the 
early days of England’s trade expeditions to West Africa.83  After an initial 
curiosity with the many different shades of black skin color, English explorers 
and their countrymen in the late 1500s began to consider black skin color to be 
unclean and otherwise worse than their own complexion.84  These explorers 
frowned upon and labeled West Africans’ religious practices as being 
heathenism.85  They also gave negative connotations to Africans’ alleged 
savage behavior, including the types of foods they ate, the kinds of clothes they 
wore, their manner of communication, the number of wives they had, their 
practice of “cosmetic mutilation,” and other cultural behaviors that were 
different than behavior common in England.86  These early Englishmen used 
black Africans’ cultural and physical differences as justification for their 
beliefs that Africans were lower-level beasts.87 
In furtherance of the beast metaphor, Englishmen had a substantial fixation 
with Africans’ sexual life and created many myths that accentuated and labeled 
Africans’ sexual behavior as being “lewd, lascivious, and wanton.”88  These 
beliefs included allegations that Africans were overly lustful and beast-like, 
and that African women had sex with apes.89  These negative impressions of 
and feelings toward Africans were probably a psychological projection of the 
Englishmen’s own negative self-images (wants, desires, behaviors, sexual 
fantasies, and appetite) upon a group of African people who readily supplied 
the type of different cultural and physical attributes that Englishmen could use 
to support their argument that they were at least better than the Africans.90 
 
 83. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
NEGRO, 1550–1812, 4-11 (1968). 
 84. Id. at 7.  One scholar asserts that Englishmen considered black skin color to be similar to 
their general definition of black: “‘Deeply stained with dirt; soiled, dirty, foul. . . . Having dark or 
deadly purposes, malignant; pertaining to or involving death, deadly; baneful, disastrous, 
sinister. . . . Foul, iniquitous, atrocious, horrible, wicked.’”  Id. (quoting the Oxford English 
Dictionary). 
 85. See id. at 20-21. 
 86. See id. at 25-26. 
 87. See id. at 28. 
 88. JORDAN, supra note 83, at 32. 
 89. See id. at 31.  Some Englishmen, though probably a minority of them, even believed that 
Africans descended from apes or apes descended from Africans, and that sex between Africans 
and apes created other monstrous beasts.  See id. at 28-32.  Along these lines, Englishmen had 
negative impressions of the naked or skimpy attire that Africans wore and of the polygamy 
practices of Africans, all which tended to reinforce English notions that Africans were lustful 
beings.  See id. at 25.  Thus, when combined with Africans’ religious practices, Africans’ alleged 
lustfulness and alleged savage behavior reinforced Englishmen’s beliefs that Africans were 
savages.  See id.  Such labels tended to increase the self-image of Englishmen because Africans 
were a group to which the Englishmen could look upon as being creatures whom they were both 
different from and better than.  See id. 
 90. See id. at 40-43. 
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Consistently, some white Americans have passed down their negative 
images from one generation to another, starting from colonial times.91  They 
have also used the black inferiority theory in a constant effort to lower African 
Americans’ social and economic status.  Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., in 
Shades of Freedom: Racial Politics and Presumptions of the American Legal 
Process,92 has extensively discussed the beginning and the continuation of the 
black inferiority theory from the early colonial period in North America to 
modern time.  In his opinion, the colonists, as a uniting theme, set up black 
people of African descent as the common foe to whom white people could look 
to as being inferior.93  This belief allowed lower class white people to feel 
good about themselves because they could always view black people as being 
worse off than white people.  This belief in white supremacy, when combined 
with the possibility that lower class white people could one day become a 
member of the elite class of white people, minimized the possibility that lower 
class white people of different ethnic backgrounds would join with black 
people and protest against the unequal distribution of wealth that the white 
ruling class controlled.94 
Persistently, white Americans used this black inferiority theory in colonial 
America to support state laws that legalized slavery,95 to establish the legal 
inferiority of black people96 and their children,97 to prevent free black people 
from holding public office,98 to prevent interracial marriages,99 and to prevent 
 
 91. See infra text accompanying notes 183–93. 
 92. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996). 
 93. Id. at 12.  One commentator noted that: 
Black slavery provided a floor beneath which no white could fall and laid the foundation 
for racial solidarity in a society rife with class divisions.  As long as any white, no matter 
how lowly, could look down on the Negro, those class divisions did not seem quite so 
formidable.  Racial unity allowed nonslaveholding whites to treasure their liberty and 
support slavery. 
IRAN BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 369 (1975). 
 94. See id. at 10-13.  Judge Higginbotham painstakingly discusses the different periods in 
Virginia during which white people in America (by enacting racially discriminatory laws) 
institutionalized the black inferiority theory throughout every aspect of human life in America 
(thereby relegating African Americans to inferior positions in their social, economic, and political 
lives).  He also shows how the Supreme Court, through its restrictive interpretation of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, struck down federal laws designed to end discrimination 
against African Americans and gave federal legitimacy to the “separate but equal” doctrine.  See 
generally HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92 passim. 
 95. See id. at 29-30.  “The justification of the institution of slavery rested on the innate 
inferiority theory of black people, their unfitness for freedom, and their incapacity to govern 
themselves.”  BERLIN, supra note 93, at 369. 
 96. See id. at 32, 47. 
 97. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92, at 32, 35, 47. 
 98. Id. at 172. 
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the prosecution of slave masters who whipped their slaves to death.100  The 
Supreme Court of the United States buttressed the legitimacy of these types of 
discriminatory state laws by holding in Dred Scott v. Sandford that from the 
beginning, black people have been inferior to white people in America and that 
they have had only those rights that white people have given them.101 
Even the South’s loss in the Civil War and the subsequent enactment of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments did not dislodge notions of 
black inferiority.  Instead, white people in southern states regained political 
power through a deal with President Rutherford Hayes that led to the 
withdrawal of federal troops from southern states after the Civil War.102  This 
withdrawal gave southern states the opportunity to enact the infamous Jim 
Crow laws103 and Black Codes104 that virtually re-enslaved African Americans 
through forced segregation in all aspects of their social and economic lives.105 
 
 99. Id. at 43. 
 100. Id. at 30, 51. 
 101. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856).  See also 
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92, at 64 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 
404-05 (1856), and stating that “[o]n the contrary, [African Americans] were at that time 
considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race”). 
 102. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92, at 91-93. 
 103. See id. at 104, 117.  Southern states enacted Jim Crow laws so that white people could 
maintain white supremacy by segregating and denying equal opportunities to African Americans.  
See Barry C. Feld, Race Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative 
“Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1470.  The author noted that “[u]ntil the 1960s, law, 
custom, and extra-legal violence in the South combined to create and enforce a caste system of 
white supremacy.  Blacks were the victims of extreme racial domination through duly enacted 
“Jim Crow” laws as well as extra-legal violence.” Id. at 1469-70 (footnotes omitted).  Racial 
prejudice was a motivating factor behind the enactment of these laws.  G. Edward White, The 
Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1563 (2003) (asserting that 
“[t]he legislatures that had passed Jim Crow statutes had been motivated by racial prejudice, and 
African Americans had systematically been excluded from the legislative process”). 
  However, given that many white people knew that they were descendants of African 
Americans or otherwise had “black blood” in their bodies, courts did not engage in a rigorous 
enforcement of Jim Crow segregation laws especially when a white person with “black blood” 
wanted to pass as a white person.  Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United 
States, 112 YALE L.J. 1473, 1504 (2003) (asserting “that many white Southerners had African 
ancestry and that white communities could function peacefully with that knowledge, whether as 
family secrets or idle gossip” and that “the courts confronted these realities and generated a body 
of law that encouraged suits for loss of white racial reputation and discouraged efforts to 
investigate and uncover individuals’ racial backgrounds.”). 
 104. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92, at 75, 84-85, 232 n.36. 
 105. See id. at 75.  The Hayes–Tilden compromise resulted in Hayes, who lost the majority of 
the popular votes in the election of 1876, being awarded the majority of the electoral votes in 
return for his agreement that he would withdraw federal troops from the South.  See Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 775, 787-88 (2003).  “Samuel 
Tilden graciously accepted the commission’s vote, while Rutherford B. Hayes agreed to serve 
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As in the past, the Supreme Court, by narrowly interpreting certain laws 
that Congress enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment (including the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866106 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875107), was complicit with 
the southern states in their de jure re-enslavement of African Americans.108  
Consistent with its prior rulings, the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson held in 1896 
that a state law providing “separate but equal” facilities for white people and 
for African Americans did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.109  Plessy 
 
only one term as a means to quiet discontent over the decision.  Hayes agreed further to cut a deal 
with Southern Democrats to end Reconstruction in exchange for their not challenging further the 
commission decision.”  Id.  The withdrawal of the federal troops gave Southern states the 
opportunity to use violence and the threat of violence to segregate and otherwise take away 
African Americans’ social, economic, and political rights.  See Jeffrey J. Wallace, Ideology vs. 
Reality: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in a Color Blind Society, 36 AKRON L. REV. 693, 714 
(2003) (asserting that “[d]uring the Reconstruction Era and for a short period that ended with the 
Hayes Tilden Compromise of 1877, African Americans enjoyed some semblance of freedom and 
equality.”).  One author reflected: 
In a society born in racism with slavery as its primary means of production a society 
whose founding documents and principles speak of liberty and equality but 
simultaneously accommodated the persistence of slavery, a society that fought a bloody 
civil war in part to attempt to ameliorate the injustices and harms of slavery and then 
within twenty years sold out its equality aspirations again with the Hayes-Tilden 
compromise . . . . 
Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, 
Race & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 66-67 (2003). 
 106. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92, at 75-80.  See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 39th Cong. 1st 
Sess. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
 107. 43d Cong. 2d Sess. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (March 1, 1875). 
 108. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92, at 75-80, 104-07.  Regarding the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, the Supreme Court upheld certain state laws that prevented African Americans from 
testifying against white Americans.  Regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Supreme Court 
made an impermissible distinction between public rights and social rights, holding that racial 
discrimination in public accommodations were social rights that the Thirteenth Amendment did 
not outlaw because such discrimination was not a “badge” or “incident” of slavery, nor, according 
to the Supreme Court, was such unequal provision of public accommodation a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.  See id. at 104-07. 
 109. 163 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1896).  One commentator stated: 
It is worth remembering that for some time under the separate but equal doctrines of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, the United States Constitution was interpreted to give comfort and 
support to racist policies. 
  The courts must bear a heavy share of the burden of American racism. An 
outpouring of recent historical scholarship on racism and the American law reveals the 
outrageous and humiliating extent to which American lawyers, judges, and legislators 
created, perpetuated, and defended racist American institutions.  Legal rules recognized 
and justified racism.  More importantly, legal rules enforced racism by making 
segregation and the other degradations of racism a legal duty rather than an act of 
individual free will.  In the process they cleared the consciences of white Americans by 
relieving them of any sense of responsibility for racist practices. 
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was tantamount to the Court’s official recognition of the black inferiority 
theory, and it gave Southern states the federal legal authority to continue their 
policies of separating the races in separate, but unequal, public facilities.110  It 
was not until approximately fifty-eight years later, after much inhumane 
discrimination inflicted by white Americans upon African Americans, that the 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education held in 1954 that the “separate 
but equal doctrine” violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.111  Despite Brown, however, southern states frequently continued 
to practice discrimination, disregarding the Supreme Court’s order to end 
school segregation with “all deliberate speed.”  These states were intent on 
furthering the black inferiority theory to the social, economic, and political 
detriment of African Americans.112 
Because of the persistent institutionalization of the black inferiority theory, 
substantial change and opposition against racial discrimination did not occur 
until the 1960s, when African Americans and supportive white Americans 
engaged in mass acts of civil disobedience under the leadership of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and many others, including such student leaders as John 
Lewis, James Bevel, and Diana Nash.113  These mass demonstrations, 
including sit-ins at lunch counters, freedom rides throughout Southern states, 
and the media coverage of these incidents, prodded the administrations of 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson into supporting civil rights laws to end racial 
 
Oliver R. Goodenough, Biology, Behavior, and Criminal Law: Seeking A Responsible Approach 
to an Inevitable Interchange, 22 VT. L. REV. 263, 281 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  See also Jack 
F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: 
Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 46 (1992) (stating that “[j]ust as racial 
oppression against African Americans was justified by United States Supreme Court decisions 
such as Plessey [sic] v. Ferguson, similar decisions branded Indian Nations as ignorant and 
uncivilized. . . . [and] ‘as an inferior race of people, without privileges of citizens[]’” until a 
federal court, in 1879, held that “an Indian was a ‘person’ within the meaning of federal law.”) 
(footnotes omitted); Robert W. Collin & Robin Morris Collin, Sustainability and Environmental 
Justice: Is the Future Clean and Black?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10968, 10968  (2001) (asserting that 
the legacy of Plessy and segregation cause environmental racism where polluting entities are 
disproportionately located in minority communities and stating that “[t]he footprint of slavery and 
Jim Crow created much of the current landscape of waste sites and environmental racism.”). 
 110. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92, at 117.  “In numerous subsequent school cases, state and 
federal courts continued to approve racial discrimination and segregation; most of the courts or 
counsel of record in those cases cited or relied upon Plessy as support for expansive endorsements 
of racial subjugation.”  Id. 
 111. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 112. See William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court By State Officials: A Case Study of 
Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 492-93 (2002) (discussing how 
Southern states engaged in strategies to avoid complying with Brown’s “‘all deliberate speed’” 
for school desegregation). 
 113. See generally JOHN LEWIS & MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A 
MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998). 
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discrimination in public accommodations, in employment, and in voting.114  
These civil rights laws set the foundation for many lawsuits and other legal 
enforcement actions that have today substantially enhanced African 
Americans’ rights, access to political power, and social and economic status. 
Despite the eradication of most public acts of racial discrimination, the 
black inferiority theory continues to operate in this country today through 
many acts of covert racial discrimination.115  In surreptitious ways, it continues 
to lower the status of African Americans and other minorities, and it otherwise 
requires that they work twice as hard and be subjected to substantially more 
frustration, stress, and grief before they can obtain a portion of their rightful 
share of this country’s resources.116 
Given the historical persistence and present existence of the black 
inferiority theory and racism, no African American (no matter how successful 
he or she may be) is totally free, especially when the theory manifests itself 
through facially-neutral governmental and social policies that allocate 
educational and economic resources in ways that have a disproportionate 
impact on African Americans and other minorities, despite an alleged lack of 
discriminatory intent.  This existence of policies with a discriminatory effect is 
widespread even though the Civil War Amendments, and laws enacted under 
them, were supposed to outlaw racial discrimination and its harmful effects. 
The above discussion of historical racial discrimination through the use of 
the black inferiority theory is relevant not only to current social, political, and 
economic discrimination against African Americans and other minorities, but it 
is also germane to present-day racial discrimination in the health care industry. 
B. The Black Inferiority Theory’s Impact on the Health Care Profession 
If the black inferiority theory has impacted the treatment of African 
Americans in all aspects of their lives, then it follows that it has had similar 
harmful effects on African Americans when physicians and hospitals have 
provided them with medical treatment.  The history of medical treatment in 
this country strongly supports this conclusion.117 
 
 114. See id. 
 115. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the 
Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 433 (2002) 
(asserting that “[m]ore often than not, accounts of discrimination in the workplace would depict 
the kind of covert or unconscious racism that is not easily recognized or acknowledged”). 
 116. See Joe R. Feagin et al., The Many Costs of Discrimination: The Case of Middle-Class 
African Americans, 34 IND. L. REV. 1313, 1346 (2001) (discussing the stress that African 
Americans endure from workplace discrimination). 
 117. See 2 W. MICHAEL BYRD & LINDA A. CLAYTON, AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA: 
RACE, MEDICINE, AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 1900–2000 passim (2002) 
[hereinafter 2 BYRD & CLAYTON] (discussing white physicians’ participation in racist medical 
treatment throughout the history of the United States). 
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Slavery is the beginning point of an analysis that examines the impact of 
racism on the medical treatment of African Americans.  It was during that 
“Peculiar Institution” that slave masters developed a separate system for 
African Americans’ medical treatment.118  Under this system, masters provided 
slaves with medical treatment through a system of “healers” who generally did 
not have medical training.119  Some of these healers, known as “root healers,” 
“conjure men,” and “midwives,” were slaves who treated other slaves.120  
White physicians, with medical training, normally provided treatment to slaves 
only in extreme circumstances.121  Furthermore, the treatment that these white 
physicians provided was frequently of an inferior quality than the treatment 
that such physicians gave to their white patients.122  Some of these white 
physicians had a financial disincentive to provide quality medical treatments to 
slaves because some slave masters used “practice-by-the-year” contracts, under 
which white physicians were given a set amount of money to treat designated 
slaves as frequently as they needed treatment.123  In addition to providing 
inferior care to slaves, white physicians also discriminated against free African 
Americans who did not have access to the inferior care that physicians gave to 
slaves because white physicians would not treat them.124 
White physicians during slavery also conducted experimentations on 
slaves, including operating on them multiple times without anesthesia to 
perfect “vesicovaginal fistulas and vaginal gynecologic surgery.”125  Some of 
these physicians used ether experimentally as an anesthesia on slaves, and 
some of them performed many other unauthorized experiments on slaves.  
Some physicians even went so far as to purchase slaves for the purpose of 
performing experiments on them.126  Some white physicians even used slaves’ 
 
 118. See id. at 12. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Larry J. Pittman, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Impacts on 
Disfavored Groups, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 774, 807-816 (1998) (discussing different types of 
discrimination in white physicians’ treatment of slaves). 
 123. Id. at 811.  These treatment contracts caused slaves to receive substandard care because 
physicians had an incentive to provide them with less care to maximize profits from the lump sum 
payments that masters would give to physicians for a specified period of time.  See id. at 811-12. 
 124. 1 W. MICHAEL BYRD & A. CLAYTON, AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA: A MEDICAL 
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE PROBLEM OF RACE: BEGINNINGS TO 1900, at 270 
(2000) [hereinafter 1 BYRD & CLAYTON]. 
 125. Id. at 271. 
 126. Id. at 270-278 (asserting that Dr. J. Marion Sims, a trailblazer gynecologist, “even 
purchased one of the women to continue operating upon her”). 
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bodies for autopsies, possibly going so far as to rob slaves’ graves to obtain 
corpses for autopsies.127 
White physicians in the South during slavery were not the only ones to 
provide racist medical treatments.  After the start of the Civil War, many slaves 
ran away and joined the U.S. Army.  Despite their service, these men were not 
given the same quality of care that white physicians gave white soldiers 
because many white physicians would not treat African-American soldiers.128  
The U.S. Army and its white physicians also frequently discriminated against 
the few African-American physicians who were available to treat African-
American soldiers.129  When African-American soldiers did receive medical 
treatments, it was frequently from physicians who had marginal skills, as they 
were the only ones who would treat African-American soldiers.130  One legacy 
of racist medical treatments during slavery is that the pervasiveness of white 
physicians’ racism (and white peoples’ racism in general) created a system in 
which white physicians, white people, and African Americans came to expect 
that white physicians would give African Americans a lower quality of medical 
care than they would give their white patients.131 
This expectation of an inferior quality of medical treatment for African 
Americans persisted after slavery was abolished,132 as white physicians 
continued their discrimination by refusing to treat free African Americans.133  
These acts of white physicians’ racism were supported by racist scientific 
articles that some white physicians and other authors wrote in an attempt to 
prove that African Americans were biologically and intellectually inferior to 
white people.134  From Reconstruction until the late 1960s, many white 
physicians openly accepted the notion that it was proper to provide inferior 
medical treatment to African Americans because they allegedly were 
biologically inferior.  Accordingly, there was no need to provide high quality 
medical treatment to them because their race would die out on its own because 
of its allegedly inherent inferiority.135 
 
 127. Pittman, supra note 122, at 812. 
 128. 1 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 124, at 341. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 353. 
 133. 1 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 124, at 355. 
 134. See id. at 299.  Regarding writings of the period that argued that African Americans were 
inherently inferior, Professors Byrd and Clayton state: “[The influence of these so-called 
scientific writings] promoted and promulgated racism within the medical profession and 
American society that continues even today, at the dawn of the twenty-first century.”  Id. at 299 
(emphasis added). 
 135. See id. at 353. 
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Given such racist viewpoints, some white physicians would not even 
provide medical treatments to African-American patients.136  When white 
physicians and hospitals did supply treatments to African Americans, they 
normally provided the treatments in substandard, segregated facilities where 
the quality of care was inferior to that given to whites.137  As such, white 
physicians became complicit in the use of Jim Crow laws to oppress African 
Americans and otherwise institutionalize the segregation of African-American 
patients from white patients.138 
In addition to not wanting to treat African Americans on an equal basis, 
white physicians and the American Medical Association opposed and 
discriminated against those African-American physicians who had the 
capability to receive a medical education despite the substantial racial 
obstacles that white physicians, and society in general, placed in their paths.139  
For example, from 1870 through the 1960s, white medical societies throughout 
the United States would not accept African-American physicians as members, 
despite the fact that many African-American physicians were brilliant and 
well-trained.140  Without medical society memberships, African-American 
physicians could not obtain staff privileges at white-controlled hospitals, could 
not consult with white specialists, could not obtain malpractice insurance, and 
could not become members on the staffs at the nation’s teaching hospitals.141 
During this period, some African-American physicians survived only by 
assuming a second job as either a dentist or other worker to supplement their 
inadequate incomes from their medical practice.142  And, it was not uncommon 
for some white physicians to steal the African-American patients of African-
American physicians by convincing such patients that African-American 
physicians were unqualified.143  Furthermore, after white physicians assumed 
control of medical education, they instituted medical school policies that either 
prohibited many medical schools from accepting African-American medical 
students or conditioned the acceptance of these students upon an agreement 
from the students to practice medicine in a foreign country.144  Even when 
 
 136. Id. at 355. 
 137. Id. at 355.  See also Pittman, supra note 122, at 814.  “[M]any southern white physicians 
would not treat African Americans unless they paid high fees in advance of treatment, with no 
possibility of credit from either the physicians or from drug stores.”  Id. at n.159 (citation 
omitted). 
 138. 1 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 124, at 352-53. 
 139. See id. at 384. 
 140. Id. at 399-01. 
 141. Id. at 401. 
 142. Id. at 404. 
 143. 1 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 124, at 392, 403. 
 144. Id. at 388. 
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African-American medical students were admitted into white medical schools, 
these schools discriminated against them.145 
Because many white physicians either would not treat African-American 
patients or would treat them only on an unequal, segregated basis, two white 
physicians founded Howard University Medical School and Meharry Medical 
School.  Founded in 1868 and 1876, respectively, these schools were 
established to train African-American medical students so that African-
American patients would have access to African-American physicians.146  
These schools were successful, and as a result white physicians and white 
medical schools seemed jealous of their success; therefore, the white schools 
discriminated against white physicians who taught at Howard’s medical 
school.147  The white establishment also tried to discredit the qualifications of 
African-American physicians who graduated from these African-American 
medical schools, in part because it feared the competition for African-
American patients that these African-American physicians posed.148 
This jealousy was all the more problematic given that most white 
physicians did not believe that African-American patients should receive equal 
medical treatment.  Many believed the scientific racism by accepting the view 
that African Americans were physically and intellectually inferior to white 
patients, that African Americans were to blame for their own medical 
conditions, and that, being the weaker race, African Americans would not 
survive because of their poor health status.149 
Relying upon such notions of black inferiority, some white scholars, even 
as late as the 1960s, reasserted arguments based on the teachings of Social 
Darwinism and the eugenics movement, alleging that African Americans were 
genetically inferior to white Americans and that there was nothing that could 
be done to improve their health status in America.150  These arguments were in 
part made to influence governmental policies regarding education, nutrition, 
and medical assistance for African Americans.151  Some white physicians used 
these arguments to further such eugenic policies as forced sterilization, 
whereby white physicians sterilized a disproportionate number of African-
American females as a quid pro quo for the females’ reception of welfare and 
 
 145. Id. at 400.  Therefore, despite white physicians’ racial discrimination against African-
American patients, many of them greedily sought to prevent African-American physicians from 
making a living as practicing physicians.  At least in part, this situation occurred because these 
white physicians wanted to continue to provide unequal treatment to African-American patients, 
yet continue to make money treating these patients.  See id. at 391-92. 
 146. Id. at 387-90, 394-98. 
 147. See id. at 397. 
 148. See 1 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 124, at 397. 
 149. See id. at 408-09. 
 150. See 2 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 117, at 430. 
 151. Id. 
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other benefits.152  White physicians became involved in this sterilization effort 
for the purpose of extinguishing the African-American race by taking away 
African-American women’s ability to procreate.153  Therefore, even when 
some African-American women had the financial resources to pay for their 
medical treatments, some white physicians refused to treat their pregnancies 
unless the women consented to sterilization.154  Federal and state governmental 
policies supported these coerced sterilizations, and they were, in part, based 
upon the notion that African Americans, being the alleged inferior race, should 
not reproduce.155 
Physicians and some state governments also used Social Darwinism, 
eugenics, and general notions of black inferiority as justifications for thousands 
of non-consensual experimentations on African-American prisoners,156 and 
upon the mentally-ill, from 1965 to 1980.157  White physicians conducted 
many of these experiments upon African-American prisoners to test drugs and 
other pharmaceutical products for private drug manufacturers.158  In addition to 
testing drugs, some of these white physicians also injected patients with: 
[P]olio, hepatitis, tuberculosis, typhoid, malaria, and cancer cells; performing 
burn and radiation studies on subject-patients’ body parts, testicles, and, 
occasionally, their entire bodies; feeding them radioactive and other toxic 
substances; applying and smearing poison, infectious agents, and irritants to 
their body surfaces; and subjecting volunteers to various powerful 
hallucinogenic and psychotropic drugs.159 
 Many of these experiments were not for the purpose of treating the 
victims’ medical conditions; rather, they were for the purpose of obtaining 
medical knowledge that physicians would primarily use to treat white 
patients.160  These and other harmful human experiments, using such selection 
criteria as race, religion, mental capacity, and incarceration, became so 
 
 152. See id. at 455.  Although many white physicians readily sterilized African-American 
females, they would seldom sterilize young white females of childbearing age, apparently 
because they knew that large-scale sterilizations would retard the growth of the white population.  
See id. at 458 (quoting ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 221 (1981)).  Apparently, 
many white physicians were not very concerned about the genocide of the African-American 
race; rather, they almost seemed to have wanted such a result.  See id. at 455, 470-71. 
 153. See id. at 284-85. 
 154. See id. at 455. 
 155. See 2 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 117, at 452, 455. 
 156. See id. at 461, 469. 
 157. Id. at 468. 
 158. See id. at 470-71. 
 159. Id. at 461.  Not only did white physicians subject African Americans to these coerced 
human experiments, but other powerless Americans, such as military personnel and mental 
patients, were also subjected to hundreds of experiments in the name of scientific progress.  Id. at 
460. 
 160. See 2 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 117, at 461. 
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pervasive that eventually federal governmental agencies passed laws and 
regulations to guard against such abuses.161 
Nevertheless, these regulations were not sufficient to prevent the notorious 
Tuskegee Syphilis Experimentation.  This experiment lasted from 1932 until 
1972.  It was a United States Public Health Service’s study of the effects of 
syphilis on 399 African-American men, many of whom were secretly injected 
with the virus without their informed consent and without their being given 
appropriate medical treatments.162  Many of these African-American men 
endured years of unnecessary pain and suffering before their deaths, even 
though penicillin was available to treat their condition.163  Those who 
experimented on these men did not do it to treat the men’s medical conditions; 
rather, the experimenters sought medical knowledge regarding syphilis’ effects 
if left untreated.164  This same type of human experimentation without a 
therapeutic purpose occurred in a 1972 experiment involving twenty-two 
African-American women, whom white physicians treated with an unapproved 
“Super Coil surgical procedure” that subsequently led to some of the women 
having hysterectomies.165  The public outcry against the Tuskegee experiment 
and some of the other experiments led to the enactment of laws and regulations 
that govern human experimentation.166 
The importance of the history of racist human experimentation and other 
discriminatory treatment is that it shows that white physicians have readily 
adopted Social Darwinist notions and eugenic theories of black inferiority.  
These physicians have allowed such notions to influence the nature and quality 
of their treatments of African American and other minority patients.167  These 
physicians have played a major role in supporting the racist belief that African-
American patients are genetically and intellectually inferior to white patients, 
and that therefore African Americans require a lower quality of medical 
treatment. 
 
 161. Id. at 471-72.  In other words, physicians’ segregated and inferior medical treatments of 
African Americans were consistent with the historical theory of black inferiority, and such racist 
treatments assumed that African Americans “were less than human.”  See Sidney D. Watson, 
Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 211 
(2001). 
 162. King & Wolf, supra note 75, at 1027-28 (discussing physicians’ discriminatory 
treatment of African Americans). 
 163. For a detailed discussion of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, see JAMES H. JONES, BAD 
BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1993). 
 164. See King & Wolf, supra note 75, at 1027. 
 165. See Pittman, supra note 122, at 816 (citing Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation 
and Racism: Trusting the Health Care System Ain’t Always Easy! An African-American 
Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 191, 202-04 (1996)). 
 166. See 2 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 117, at 472-73. 
 167. See id. at 474-475. 
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What this history shows is that white physicians and white hospitals have 
for hundreds of years been a key force or agent in the perpetuation of harmful 
and racist medical treatments to African Americans—treatments that have 
caused many deaths and other negative medical outcomes.168  Not until the 
1960s, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964169 and the enactment of 
the Medicare program in 1965, did substantial desegregation occur in hospitals 
and in other medical facilities.170  However, despite these federal laws against 
racial discrimination, hospitals and physicians still found ways to limit the 
beneficial effects of desegregation in the health care industry.  For example, 
Medicare financial incentives in July 1996 led to the outward appearance of 
desegregation in 6,500 (ninety-two percent) of the nation’s hospitals.171  But 
consistent with the historical ways in which many white Americans have 
creatively changed rules and procedures to conceal persistent discrimination, 
white physicians and hospitals employed measures to both desegregate health 
care facilities and maintain some of the historical racial discrimination in the 
health care industry.172  Such procedural changes included hospitals changing 
double rooms into single rooms so that white patients did not have to be in the 
same room with African-American patients, hospitals discharging a 
disproportionate number of white patients into more segregated nursing homes 
where they did not have to be near African-American patients, and physicians 
ordering that certain medical treatments take place on an outpatient basis in 
outpatient facilities where white patients did not have to be near African-
American patients.173 
Although these procedural changes might have been partially motivated by 
economic reasons and by the evolution of medical treatments, they were also 
partially motivated by racism.174  Professor David Barton Smith states: 
The argument here is not that racial attitudes were the sole determining cause 
of all these changes.  No single factor can explain why the organization of 
health in the United States evolved in distinctively different ways than in other 
 
 168. See generally id. (discussing white physicians’ racism and the harmful effects that it has 
had on African Americans’ morbidity and mortality throughout the history of this country). 
 169. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6 
(2000)). 
 170. King & Wolf, supra note 75, at 1031.  See also Watson, supra note 164, at 214 
(discussing how the Medicare statute’s anti-discrimination rule was instrumental in achieving 
some health care desegregation). 
 171. Watson, supra note 161, at 215. 
 172. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 
201 (1999) (asserting that African-American patients and other poor patients have experienced an 
increase in the amount of medical treatments that hospitals and physicians have given them as a 
result of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, including an increase in the rates of contact with 
physicians and rate of hospitalizations). 
 173. See id. at 226-33. 
 174. See id. at 228. 
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developed countries.  Its evolution reflects the adaptation to a complex 
combination of pressures.  The argument here is that those racial attitudes and 
concerns helped often subtlety [sic] and indirectly, to reinforce, magnify, and 
legitimize these changes in use and methods of payment.175 
 Obviously, the above-described organizational changes have assisted in the 
continuation of a health care system whereby African-American patients and 
white patients still receive a substantial amount of their medical treatments in a 
segregated manner.176 
In addition to the present separation of patients during hospitalizations and 
other treatments, the medical studies discussed above in Part II (involving 
racial disparities in heart treatments, cancer treatments, kidney treatments and 
in many other medical treatments) show that racial discrimination presently 
exists in the manner in which hospitals and physicians actually give medical 
treatments to their African-American and other minority patients.177  This 
racial discrimination exists despite Title VI and other federal laws that expose 
those who discriminate, leading to a possible loss of financial resources.178  It 
 
 175. Id.  Professor Smith acknowledged that historically many hospitals and physicians 
treated African-American patients even during the period of Jim Crow; however, the medical 
treatment of African Americans always took place in different rooms at the hospitals or at 
different times in physicians’ offices.  See id. at 225-26. 
 176. See id. at 226-33.  Professor Smith stated: “As the pressures to shorten length of stay 
increase, as the pressure to do diagnostic and surgical procedures on an ambulatory basis 
increases, as hospital occupancy drops and competition for a shrinking market share increases, 
even semiprivate rooms have become de facto private ones.  People now recover and die in ever 
more splendid isolation.”  Id. at 233. 
 177. See Watson, supra note 161, at 208 (discussing that Hispanic and Native Americans, 
despite being qualified and able to afford medical treatment, also receive less treatments than 
white Americans).  In commenting on some of the changes in the patterns of white patients’ and 
African-American patients’ medical treatment,  Professor Watson has also stated: “Although 
other factors contributed to this restructuring of American health care, racial bias and selective 
Title VI enforcement played a significant role.”  Sidney D. Watson, Health Care Divided: Race 
and Healing a Nation, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 601, 605 (2000) (book review). 
 178. The rapid “overt” integration of hospitals after the passage of Title VI in 1964, and after 
the enactment of the Medicare program in 1965, provides evidence that hospitals and physicians 
will integrate medical services and stop racism in the provision of medical treatments to protect 
their own financial self-interest when a failure to do so means a loss of funds.  See generally 
Watson, supra note 161 (asserting that health care payers might be able to end some of the racial 
disparities in medical treatments by using financial incentives to control physicians’ behaviors).  
Therefore, it is reasonable and desirable that scholars explore the possibility that financial 
incentives might motivate physicians to change their practices to avoid creating racial disparities 
in medical treatments.  See id.  However, although such financial incentives may reduce some of 
the disparities, it is doubtful that such incentives are sufficient enough to eliminate all of the racial 
discrimination that exists in the health care industry.  See supra notes 12–81. 
  First, Title VI’s and Medicare’s financial incentives have not eliminated covert racial 
discrimination in the health care industry despite being in existence for approximately thirty 
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years.  This failure is in part shown by the above-referenced studies revealing the many current 
racial disparities in medical treatments.  See supra notes 12–81. 
  Second, some health care purchasers, such as Health Maintenance Organizations 
(“HMOs”) and other managed care plans, probably do not have an incentive to eliminate racial 
disparities because doing so might increase their costs given that eliminating disparities in 
treatment would probably mean more treatments for African Americans and other minorities.  See 
Randall, supra note 10, at 218-19 (arguing that African Americans, as a group, might be sicker 
than white patients and that, in a managed care regime that seeks to reduce the utilization of 
medical treatment, African Americans might not be receiving some medically necessary 
treatment).  See Watson, supra note 161, at 222 (asserting that “[a] managed care plan can have 
an overall good rating, while disproportionately failing to deliver services to minorities who are 
likely to be sickest and most in need of care.”).  Other scholars have noted that managed care 
organizations’ cost-containment procedures might have a disproportionate impact on African 
Americans and other minorities.  See Rene Bowser, Eliminating Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Medical Care, 30 SUM. BRIEF 25, 26 (2001); Norman L. Cantor and George C. Thomas III, The 
Legal Bounds of Physician Conduct Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 160 (2000); Ellen 
Wertheimer, Shakespeare In Law: The Use of History in Shattering Student Credulity, 45 VILL. 
L. REV. 463, 470 (2000); Steven P. Wallace et al., The Consequences of Color-Blind Health 
Policy for Older Racial and Ethnic Minorities, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 334 (1998); 
Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Preserving Community in Health Care, 22 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 147, 168 (1997). 
  Third, employers and other health care purchasers may not be overly concerned with the 
disparity in treatments because such unequal treatments might result in their paying fewer 
premiums.  To the extent that employers, other health care purchasers, and managed care 
organizations are influenced by historical notions of black inferiority, these entities might not 
have the will or desire to force medical providers to give African Americans and other minority 
patients the same quality of medical care that providers give to white patients whom such entities 
might consider more deserving of the best medical treatments.  Along these lines, it is significant 
that despite many studies showing racial disparities in medical treatments, neither employers, 
health care purchasers, nor managed care organizations have publicly disclosed any plans or 
strategies to prevent racial disparities within their health plans.  It is worth noting that African 
Americans and Hispanics believe, more so than white patients, that insurance companies’ and 
managed care organizations’ reimbursement requirements influence their physicians’ treatment 
decisions.  HSC Study Shows Trust In Doctors Remains High, 17 EMP. ALERT 7, 7 (2000) 
(finding “[m]ore than half of African-Americans and Hispanics (56% and 54% respectively) 
agreed that their doctors were influenced by insurance rules, as compared with 40% of whites”). 
  Finally, a multi-faceted approach to ending the racial disparities in medical treatments is 
needed.  This approach appears to be the history of changes in the medical profession.  Therefore, 
this author has no objections to the use of health care purchasers’ financial incentives to help 
alleviate racial disparities in medical treatments.  But, even if such financial incentives have some 
positive effects in reducing health care racism and other racial disparities in medical treatment, 
they cannot do the job alone.  In addition to financial incentives, courts and the health care 
industry must be willing to embrace tort lawsuits and any other available methods that may assist 
in eradicating unequal medical treatments.  The availability of all methods is especially necessary 
given that the health care industry (including the organizational structure of medical purchasers 
and medical providers) is very complex. Therefore, some racial disparities in medical treatment 
will probably fall through the cracks of any financial incentive systems that health care 
purchasers use to control the unequal provision of medical treatments, particularly considering the 
covert nature of much of the racism that is now practiced. One such method to fight the current 
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appears that physicians and other health care providers are so proficient in their 
covert discrimination, and enforcers of federal anti-discrimination laws are so 
inept in their enforcement, that physicians and other providers are not very 
concerned about being punished for discrimination. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS TO ERADICATE RACIAL DISPARITIES IN MEDICAL 
TREATMENTS 
A. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Prohibition Against Racial Disparities in 
Medical Treatment 
1. The Essential Nature of Intentional Racism and Unconscious Racism 
When considering direct claims under the Thirteenth Amendment, it is 
important to note that there are at least two ways in which physicians, 
hospitals, and other medical providers can give treatments that have a racially 
disproportionate impact on African Americans and other minorities.  First, 
physicians and hospitals can engage in intentional discrimination for the 
specific purpose of denying medically necessary treatment to African 
Americans and others simply because of their race.179  Second, physicians and 
hospitals can discriminate through unconscious racism by engaging in a pattern 
of medical practice that uses stereotypes of African Americans and other 
minorities to justify giving them different medical treatment than they give to 
white patients.180  In most cases, it will be more difficult to prove an 
intentional discrimination claim.  Therefore, an unconscious racism claim 
(based upon the disproportionate impact that certain facially-neutral policies 
have on African Americans and other minorities) might be more successful.181 
A disproportionate impact claim would solve several problems that one 
might encounter when bringing an intentional discrimination claim.  First, a 
plaintiff would not have to bear the exceedingly onerous task of proving 
intentional discrimination by medical providers who might be greatly skilled at 
 
racial disparities in health treatments is the use of a direct claim under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  See infra Part IV, A–B. 
 179. Intentional discrimination was the predominate method of racial discrimination by 
physicians against African-American patients from the early beginnings until the mid-1960s 
before the federal government enacted anti-discrimination laws.  See generally 2 BYRD & 
CLAYTON, supra note 117 (discussing the history of physicians’ racial discrimination against 
African Americans). 
 180. Since the time of slavery, some physicians have used scientific writings and stereotypes 
about African Americans’ intellectual and physical conditions to justify a belief that they needed 
to be treated differently than white Americans.  See id. at 353. 
 181. A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VI and under the Fourteenth Amendment 
must show intentional discrimination.  See John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and 
Its Implications for Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2003). 
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hiding their discrimination.182  Second, the disproportionate impact claim 
might be a better means of acknowledging that some of the racial disparities in 
medical treatment might stem from unconscious racial discrimination. 
Professor Charles R. Lawrence’s statements about unconscious racism are 
instructive.  He noted: 
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism 
has played and still plays a dominant role.  Because of this shared experience, 
we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach 
significance to an individual’s race and induce negative feelings and opinions 
about nonwhites.  To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced 
all of us, we are all racists.  At the same time, most of us are unaware of our 
racism.  We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has 
influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect 
our actions.  In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial 
discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.183 
 
 182. At least one lesson from hospitals’ and physicians’ alteration of the methods of 
providing medical treatments in response to Title VI and to the Medicare program is that medical 
providers sometimes intentionally take actions that have a disproportionate impact on minorities.  
This fact is in part shown by many hospitals changing rooms from double occupancy or semi-
private to private rooms and by referring more patients to outpatient care instead of inpatient care.  
See Smith, supra note 172, at 226-33.  Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that some of the 
racial discrimination that occurs in the health care industry stems from physicians’ and other 
medical providers’ intentional racism.  Unlike some scholars, this author is not, at this stage, 
ready to say that acts of unconscious racial prejudice outnumber medical providers’ intentional 
acts of racial discrimination.  See Geiger, supra note 75, at 816.  Given that providers’ intentional 
acts of racial discrimination tend to be covert and hard to detect, much of the discrimination that 
some scholars believe to be unconscious acts of discrimination might in fact be intentional 
discrimination. 
 183. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (footnote omitted).  Professor Lawrence 
identified at least two theories about the origins of unconscious racism.  First, he referenced a 
Freudian psychoanalytic notion of the struggle between the Ego, the rational conscious process, 
and the Id, the unconscious mind that contains the “desires, wishes, and instincts that strive for 
gratification.”  Id. at 331.  As it relates to racism, the rational Ego tries to conform one’s behavior 
to the predominate public view that racism and discrimination are inappropriate.  See id. at 331-
32.  Being under the control of the Ego, the irrational, instinctive Id, normally through 
“repression,” drives its racial stereotyped beliefs about minorities into the unconscious portion of 
the human psychic.  See id.  However, not to be denied expression, the Id manifests its racist 
beliefs, through “projection,” onto minorities.  See id.  Therefore, a white person who has an Id 
propensity for being “dirty, lazy, oversexed,” and a desire not to control his instinctive, 
animalistic nature, will, instead of recognizing these “bad traits” in his own personality, project 
the traits onto African Americans and other minorities so that such minorities will be hated or 
otherwise stereotyped as having such loathsome traits when, in fact, they may not have the traits.  
See id. at 333-34.  Professor Lawrence stated: 
An examination of the beliefs that racially prejudiced people have about out- groups 
demonstrates their use of other mechanisms observed by both Freudian and nonFreudian 
[sic] behavioralists.  For example, studies have found that racists hold two types of 
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Frequently, unconscious racism mostly stems from the discriminator’s 
projection of his or her own negative traits onto the victim of the 
discrimination.184  To explain the negative projection, some have used 
Freudian theory,185 cognitive theory,186 and Carl Jung’s collective unconscious 
theory.187  Jung asserted that there are several different aspects or “archetypes” 
 
stereotyped beliefs: They believe the out-group is dirty, lazy, oversexed, and without 
control of their instincts (a typical accusation against blacks), or they believe the out-
group is pushy, ambitious, conniving, and in control of business, money, and industry (a 
typical accusation against Jews).  These two types of accusation correspond to two of the 
most common types of neurotic conflict: that which arises when an individual cannot 
master his instinctive drives in a way that fits into rational and socially approved patterns 
of behavior, and that which arises when an individual cannot live up to the aspirations and 
standards of his own conscience.  Thus, the stereotypical view of blacks implies that their 
Id, the instinctive part of their psyche, dominates their Ego, the rationally oriented part. 
The stereotype of the Jew, on the other hand, accuses him of having an overdeveloped 
Ego. In this way, the racially prejudiced person projects his own conflict into the form of 
racial stereotypes. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 184. Id. at 331-32. 
 185. See id. at 331-36. 
 186. A second theory of unconscious racism that Professor Lawrence relied upon is the 
“[c]ognitive approach to unconscious racism.”  Id. at 336-39.  This approach recognizes that 
people normally place other persons into various categories for which they ascribe certain 
characteristics or stereotypes so that they can make decisions about such persons without having 
all of the information that a complete evaluation might require.  See id. at 336-37. 
  Furthermore, each time an unconscious stereotype affects a child’s or adult’s behavior, 
the conclusions derived from the stereotype “progressively intensif[ies] [the] internal stereotypes 
because [it] reaffirm[s] the perception that members of a certain category are more similar than 
they actually are and that members of different categories are more dissimilar than they actually 
are.”  Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case For A Qualified 
Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 919 (1999).  
Therefore, the cognitive approach theorizes that unconscious racism is a learned behavior that the 
stereotype-holder automatically uses when he or she comes into contact with a member of a 
disfavored minority group.  Lawrence, supra note 183, at 337. 
 187. A third unconscious racism theory is Carl G. Jung’s shadow archetype that is a part of 
his “collective unconscious” theory, which is described as follows: 
In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature and 
which we believe to be the only empirical psyche (even if we tack on the personal 
unconscious as an appendix), there exists a second psychic system of a collective, 
universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals.  This collective 
unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited.  It consists of pre-existent 
forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give 
definite form to certain psychic contents. 
C. G. JUNG, THE ARCHETYPES AND THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 43 (R.F.C. Hull trans., 
Princeton University Press 2d ed. 1968) (1934).  See also Lawrence, supra note 183, at 323 n.26 
(asserting that requiring proof of conscious racism as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition 
that a decision is race-dependent disregards both the irrationality of racism and its effect on the 
individual and collective unconscious). 
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of the human personality, including the shadow.188  The shadow archetype, the 
one that appears to be most directly involved in racism, is the dark side of the 
human personality that consists of one’s animal instincts and negative 
personality traits that frequently exist in one’s unconsciousness and that are 
projected onto disfavored minority groups.189  In describing this phenomenon, 
Jung stated: 
In the South, I find what they call sentimental and chivalry and romance to be 
the covering of cruelty.  Cruelty and chivalry are another pair of opposites.  
The Southerners treat one another very courteously, but they treat the negro as 
they would treat their own unconscious mind if they knew what was in it.  
When I see a man in a savage rage with something outside himself I know that 
he is, in reality, wanting to be savage toward his own unconscious self.190 
One commentator stated that: “For white people, typically the Shadow 
appears in a dream as someone who is dark-skinned and considered to be a 
member of an inferior race.  Racism is therefore to a great extent a shadow 
projection by the dominant group onto members of the subordinated group.”191  
Consistently, another scholar has pointed to the interracial sexual relations that 
many slave masters and other white people, from slavery until the present time, 
have had with African Americans (females and males) despite white society’s 
general opinions that African-American sex is dirty, animalistic, and otherwise 
loathsome.192 
Whether one uses Freudian, cognitive, or Jung’s theory, it is clear that 
some white people have projected certain negative stereotypes onto African 
Americans and other minorities.  Some white physicians are guilty of the same 
 
 188. Other parts of the collective unconscious are such archetypes as the persona, the anima 
and the animus, and the self.  CALVIN S. HALL & VERNON J. NORDBY, A PRIMER OF JUNGIAN 
PSYCHOLOGY 42 (1973). 
 189. See id. 48-51. 
 190. Dr. Carl Jung, America Facing Its Most Tragic Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1912, § 5 
(Magazine), at 2. 
 191. Toni Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist From the Gender Police—Why the 
Harassment of Gays and Other Gender Nonconformists is a Form of Sex Discrimination in Light 
of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Oncale v. Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. REV. 89, 115 (1999).  See 
also CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 83-91 (1993) (discussing white America’s attitude about 
African-American sex).  Professor West stated: 
White fear of black sexuality is a basic ingredient of white racism.  And for whites to 
admit this deep fear even as they try to instill and sustain fear in blacks is to acknowledge 
a weakness—a weakness that goes down to the bone.  Social scientists have long 
acknowledged that interracial sex and marriage is the most perceived source of white fear 
of black people—just as the repeated castrations of lynched black men cries out for 
serious psychocultural explanations. 
Id. at 86-87. 
 192. See id. at 83-91. 
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type of racism.193  These negative projections are still occurring today, and 
they contribute to the current racial disparities that exist over a broad range of 
medical treatments.  To help eradicate racial discrimination flowing from such 
negative projections, this Article advocates a direct claim under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
2. The Nature of a Direct Claim Under the Thirteenth Amendment 
The current interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment (and of other civil 
rights laws) by the Supreme Court and lower-level federal courts requires a 
showing of intentional discrimination or racial animus to establish a civil 
claim.194  Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment offers the best chance in this 
country for real social justice, especially considering that many white 
physicians have mastered the art of covert racism such that they can 
successfully hide much of their racism and its harmful effects.195  The Court 
has left open two questions in its Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence.  First, 
the Court has not definitively decided whether a private plaintiff can bring a 
direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment for acts of racial 
 
 193. See generally, 2 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 117 (discussing physicians’ use of 
negative stereotypes to justify giving different treatment to African Americans). 
 194. Laufer, supra note 181, at 1617-18 (asserting that Title VI “bars only demonstrably 
intentional discrimination, and is in that respect coextensive with the prohibition of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 195. See Wade, supra note 115, at 433 (asserting that “[m]ore often than not, accounts of 
discrimination in the workplace would depict the kind of covert or unconscious racism that is not 
easily recognized or acknowledged”).  Other commentators have recognized that the Thirteenth 
Amendment itself, without any Section Two legislation from Congress, granted African 
Americans (and implicitly all Americans) liberty and equal protection of law, which is 
tantamount to an eradication of the “badges and incidents” of slavery.  Baher Azmy, Unshackling 
the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 
FORDHAM L. Rev. 981, 1007-19 (2002).  Azmy asserted that the Amendment “was ‘the final 
step’ to full freedom, which included a positive guarantee to all persons the equal enjoyment of 
all fundamental rights” and that “[i]n addition, the liberty secured by the Thirteenth Amendment 
included the right to equal protection of the laws of the country.” Id. at 1013, 1018 (footnotes 
omitted).  See also Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a 
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1990).  
“This Article argues that one of the thirteenth amendment’s [sic] primary objectives was to assure 
equal justice and universal freedom for African-American people.”  Id.  See also Jacobus 
tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to 
Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 178-80 (1951) (asserting 
that Congress’ intent in enacting the Thirteenth Amendment was to provide equal protection to 
African Americans); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1974) (same).  For additional scholarly 
commentary supporting that the Thirteenth Amendment provided for African Americans’ natural 
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, see Pittman, supra note 122, at 822-25 nn.209-
10. 
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discrimination.196  Second, even if a direct claim is available, the Court has not 
decided whether a disproportionate impact claim is one that can be asserted 
under the Thirteenth Amendment.197  This Article argues that the Court should 
recognize both a direct intentional discrimination claim and a disproportionate 
impact claim. 
Elsewhere this author has argued that the Court, in Palmer v. Thompson198 
and in City of Memphis v. Green,199 has implicitly recognized a direct claim 
under the Thirteenth Amendment, and that the Court’s Bivens-type civil 
lawsuits under the Fourth Amendment provide additional support for a direct 
claim under the Thirteenth Amendment.200  Given the availability of such a 
direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court has several other 
major issues to resolve.  First, the Court must decide whether Section One of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, in addition to eradicating the physical enslavement 
of African Americans on slave plantations, also eradicates the “badges and 
incidents” of slavery.  Section One provides: “Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction.”201 
In the past, the Court has been able to avoid a direct decision on whether 
the Thirteenth Amendment bans the “badges and incidents” of slavery.202  
However, the Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases203 presents two 
justices’ opinions on the issue.  In that case, Justice Bradley’s majority opinion 
restrictively held that the Amendment bans only the involuntary servitude of 
African Americans on the plantation and that it conferred only the fundamental 
rights that Congress sought to protect in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, namely 
the same rights as white people to “make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property.”204 
 
 196. See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 197. See generally City of Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 198. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 199. 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 200. See generally Pittman, supra note 122 (discussing the Supreme Court’s Thirteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence).  In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971), the Court held that a private citizen could file a civil 
lawsuit directly under the Fourth Amendment to seek damages from federal agents who allegedly 
searched the citizen’s home and arrested him without a warrant.  This Article advocates the same 
type of direct claim for a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  See also Pittman, supra note 
122, at 853-56. 
 201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 202. See generally Pittman, supra note 122. 
 203. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 204. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
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On the other hand, Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights 
Cases asserted that the Thirteenth Amendment’s purpose is to outlaw both the 
involuntary servitude of African Americans and the “badges and incidents of 
slavery.”205  He defined “badges and incidents” as any discrimination against 
 
 205. See id. at 36.  Some scholars are of the opinion that a majority of the members of 
Congress, both those who opposed the Amendment and those who supported it, believed that the 
Thirteenth Amendment would do more than proscribe the physical confinement of African 
Americans on slave plantations and involuntary servitude.  For example, Professor G. Sidney 
Buchanan summed up the opponents’ position: 
Thus, the main resistance to passage of the thirteenth amendment was based almost 
entirely on opposition to the expansion and centralization of national power.  Most, if not 
all, elements of congressional opposition asserted that the amendment would guarantee to 
the emancipated black a basic minimum of rights—equality under the law; protection of 
life, liberty, and property; opportunity to live, work, and move freely—and that Congress 
would be empowered to protect these rights.  The amendment’s opponents clearly 
recognized its sweeping potential and resisted its adoption, not as the first step in a series 
of undesirable steps, but as the final step itself. 
Buchanan, supra note 195, at 9.  In support of his opinion, Professor Buchanan, in part, relied 
upon a statement by Representative William S. Holman, who in opposition to the Thirteenth 
Amendment, stated: 
But, sir, the amendment goes further.  It confers on Congress the power to invade any 
State to enforce the freedom of the African in war or peace.  What is the meaning of all 
that?  Is freedom the simple exemption from personal servitude?  No, sir; in the language 
of America it means the right to participate in government, the freedom for which our 
fathers resisted the British empire.  Mere exemption from servitude is a miserable idea of 
freedom.  A pariah in the State, a subject, but not a citizen, holding any right at the will of 
the governing power.  What is this but slavery?  It exists in my own noble State.  Then, 
sir, this amendment has some significance.  Your policy, directed in its main purpose to 
the enfranchisement of a people who have looked with indifference on your struggle, who 
have given their strength to your enemies, and then the constitutional power to force them 
into freedom, to citizenship.  If such be your purpose, why deceive a noble and confiding 
people?  Your purpose in this amendment is not to increase the efficiency of your Army 
or to diminish the power of your enemies.  No, sir; you diminish the one and increase the 
other.  You run the hazard of all that to gratify your visionary fanaticism, the elevation of 
the African to the august rights of citizenship. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2962 (1864) (statement of William S. Holman).  Professor 
Buchanan also relied upon statements from Elijah Ward: 
[W]e are now called upon to sanction a joint resolution to amend the Constitution so that 
all persons shall be equal under the law, without regard to color, and so that no person 
shall hereafter be held in bondage. 
  Sir, it would seem to me that the sum total of the wisdom of the ruling party is 
contained in the dogma that the negro is exactly like the white man.  To some it may seem 
that this is not very much, hardly enough to constitute the foundation of a political system 
and an administration policy for a great nation and a numerous people; but this is a matter 
of opinion. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1865).  See also Buchanan, supra note 195, at 8. 
  Professor Buchanan cited several statements from supporters of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to show that, like the opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment, the supporters 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
170 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:131 
 
believed that it, in addition to breaking the physical bonds of slavery, also guaranteed the equal 
protection of the freed African Americans and their natural rights to liberty.  First, Representative 
Godlove S. Orth stated: 
The effect of such amendment will be to prohibit slavery in these United States, and be a 
practical application of that self-evident truth, “that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these, are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865).  See also Buchanan, supra note 195, at 10.  
Along these lines, Representative Orth also asserted: 
While we remember that it is the constitutional duty of the United States to “guaranty to 
every State in this Union a republican form of government,” let us not forget that the 
surest and safest way to discharge this duty is to provide proper guards and checks for the 
protection of individual and social rights in these communities; to keep over them, so long 
as may be necessary, a guardian watch and care; to remove every opposing element; . . . 
and last, but not least, to see that the name and spirit of human bondage shall be erased 
from every State constitution, and personal freedom without distinction assured to every 
one of their citizens. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1864). 
  Therefore, it is clear that some of the opponents and proponents of the Thirteenth 
Amendment believed that it would provide equal protection to African Americans in their 
pursuits of life and liberty.  Professor Buchanan stated: 
“[T]his then,” explained Representative Wilson, “was the slavery which the thirteenth 
amendment would abolish: The involuntary personal servitude of the Bondsman; the 
denial to the blacks, bond and free, of their natural rights through the failure of the 
government to protect them equally; the denial to the whites of their natural and 
constitutional rights through a similar failure of government.”  Stated more positively, the 
thirteenth amendment would free the slave from legal bondage, secure equal protection 
under the law for all blacks in the exercise of their natural and constitutional rights, and, 
more pervasively, secure the same equal protection under the law for all United States 
citizens of whatever race. 
Buchanan, supra note 195, at 12 (footnote omitted). 
  Other scholars have concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment proscribes not only 
physical confinement on plantations but that it also provides for equal protection of African 
Americans regarding their natural rights to life and liberty.  See generally, tenBroek, supra note 
195 (analyzing legislative history to support the conclusion that the Thirteenth Amendment 
nationalized the equal right of all to enjoy equal protection in those natural rights that constitute 
that freedom); Pittman, supra note 122.  For a discussion of one modern application of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992) (asserting arguments that the Thirteenth 
Amendment proscribes such hate speech as cross burning to intimidate African Americans). 
  As is to be expected, given the extensiveness of the Thirteenth Amendment’s legislative 
history and the politicking that members of Congress engaged in to obtain passage of the 
Amendment, some of the Thirteenth Amendment’s legislative history might be subject to 
different interpretations.  For example, Professor Michael Vorenberg stated the following 
regarding the Republican supporters of the Amendment: 
For most of the amendment’s backers, deflection rather than direct refutation was the 
preferred method of response to the fearful cry of “negro equality.”  To keep the 
amendment from becoming known as an equal rights measure and thus losing the much-
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needed support of the Democrats, Republican senators stifled the question of equal rights 
at every turn. 
MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND 
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 106 (2001).  Regarding Republicans’ definition of “equal before 
the law,” Professor Vorenberg states that “[t]his notion of equal treatment, however, rested on a 
more narrow vision of equality than we are used to today.  The Republican notion of ‘equal 
before the law’ during this period flowed from free-labor ideology and thus was usually restricted 
to laws regulating labor.”  Id. at 104. 
  Some statements by the Republican supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment are 
confusing.  For example, during the Thirteenth Amendment’s debate, Senator Timothy Howe of 
Wisconsin stated: 
And now, Mr. President, what are the apologies for this institution [of slavery]?  I have 
heard them.  We hear them daily.  That which we hear the oftenest, that which is insisted 
upon the loudest, is that slaves are only made of negroes or of the descendants of negroes, 
and that they as a race are inferior to the whites.  Whether the fact is so or not, I shall not 
spend a moment in arguing; but I affirm this, that if in the whole catalogue of excuses that 
are offered for crimes and offenses, one single excuse could be found more odious than 
the crime itself, it is this one excuse for slavery.  Admit that as a race they are inferior to 
the race of whites; I ask Senators, I ask me if that is a fact which authorizes you or me to 
enslave them? 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 113 (1864). 
  Arguably, instead of supporting that the Thirteenth Amendment does not provide for the 
equal protection of African Americans, see VORENBERG, supra, at 106, the above quote is more 
supportive of the position that the alleged inferiority is not reason to enslave them.  This 
interpretation is especially appropriate because other portions of Senator Howe’s statement show 
his opinion that those who are superior should, instead of enslaving the weaker, make the weaker 
stronger: 
Is it necessary for me to tell the American Senate that the whitest of men are made still a 
little lower than the angles?  And do you think the angles regard that as a reason for 
binding fetters upon them, for deserting them? Or, on the contrary, is it the reason why 
they are busy in our behalf to build us up as fast as they can . . . . 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 113 (1864). 
  Similarly, Senator John Henderson stated, “So in passing this amendment we do not 
confer upon the negro the right to vote.  We give him no right except his freedom, and leave the 
rest to the States.”  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1465 (1864).  However, he also noted: 
I will not be intimidated by the fears of negro equality.  The negro may possess mental 
qualities entitling him to a position beyond our present belief.  If so, I shall put no 
obstacle in the way of his elevation.  There is nothing in me that despises merit or envies 
its rewards. 
Id.  Even though Senator Henderson would have left African-Americans’ citizenship and right to 
vote to state law authority, his statement appears to show that he expected that African Americans 
would be allowed the merit of their labor, without any obstacles in their paths.  See id.  Implicit in 
his statement about merit is the notion that equal protection of laws should be provided by the 
states to ensure that one obtain the merit of his or her labor.  Even if Senator Henderson and 
Senator Howe, however, did not believe in equality and equal protection for African Americans, 
Professor Buchanan stated that “a majority of members in both the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth 
sessions of Congress saw the amendment’s legal effect as transcending the abolition of slavery.”  
Buchanan, supra note 195, at 10.  Professor Buchanan cited Representative E.C. Ingersoll of 
Illinois for his belief that “the thirteenth amendment would mean ‘freedom of speech, . . . the 
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right to proclaim the eternal principles of liberty, truth and justice . . . .’”  Id.  Professor Buchanan 
further stated “[m]ore over, the thirteenth amendment’s adoption would ensure that these rights 
[of liberty] would receive ‘the protection of the [national] government’ and the protection of 
‘equal laws.’”  Id. at 11. 
  Therefore, as discussed above, different scholars can disagree about how many members 
of Congress intended that the Thirteenth Amendment provide some kind of equal protection to 
African Americans.  However, the ascertainment of Congressional intent regarding the Thirteenth 
Amendment should not depend upon an analysis that counts how many members of Congress 
were for or against an expansive interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, or one that would 
outlaw the “badges and incidents” of slavery.  Rather, the Court should engage in an evolving or 
dynamic interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, one that is more in line with how the Court 
and Congress have developed the laws and legal interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment.  
Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 259 (1994).  William 
Eskridge asserts that: 
[U]nder an “evolutive approach . . . , the Court would overrule a statutory precedent only 
when the reasoning underlying the precedent has been discredited over time, when the 
precedent’s consequences undermine current statutory policies and legislative purposes, 
and when practical experience suggests that the statutory goals are better met by a new 
rule that does not unduly negate public as well as private reliance interests in the old rule. 
Id.  Applying an evolutive approach to the Court’s interpretation of a constitutional provision 
such as the Thirteenth Amendment means that the Court should interpret the Thirteenth 
Amendment in light of the current federal policies against racial discrimination and the current 
recognition that the same black inferiority theory that supported slavery is still the rationale that 
many white people, privately and publicly, use to justify their present discrimination against 
African Americans. 
  An evolving interpretation would have to recognize that both the Court and Congress, 
despite Congress’ intent during the debating and enacting of the Thirteenth Amendment, have 
concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment did more than cut the physical bonds of slavery.  For 
example, Congress’ enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 shows that Congress believed that 
the Thirteenth Amendment did more than prohibit the confinement of African Americans to slave 
plantations and involuntary servitude.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866, in part, gave African 
Americans the same rights as white people to “make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property.”  See 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).  Also, it is clear that those who supported the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 saw it as a law enacted by Congress under Section Two of the 
Thirteenth Amendment to enforce the Amendment.  In other words, the freedom that the 
Thirteenth Amendment declared implicitly means that, to be free, African Americans must have 
more than mere freedom from confinement on plantations.  To be free, they must have “liberty,” 
which at least includes the rights that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 granted.  tenBroek, supra note 
195, at 194.  In the words of Senator Trumbull, who sponsored the bill, “I take it that any statute 
which is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other 
citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of servitude which, 
by the Constitution, is prohibited.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (emphasis 
added).  Senator Trumbull’s statement is support for the proposition that any law that denies 
African Americans’ liberty because of racial discrimination is a violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which Senator Trumbull states also outlaws “badge[s] of servitude.”  Id.  See also 
tenBroek, supra note 195, at 192 n.46 (citing statements of many members of Congress who 
believed that the Thirteenth Amendment gave “liberty” to African Americans, and that the Civil 
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Rights Act of 1866 was an exercise of Congress’ power to ensure that states do not enact laws 
that deny African Americans the same civil rights that white people have, as listed in Section One 
of the Act). 
  Regarding the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 believed that the Thirteenth Amendment gave African Americans the natural rights of life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and that implicit in that notion of liberty was that there must 
be an equal protection of laws and rights, at least as far as the rights enumerated in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866.  See tenBroek, supra note 195.  Therefore, by enacting the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, Congress was enforcing the terms of the Thirteenth Amendment itself because under 
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress’ only authority was “to enforce [Section 
One of the Amendment, which outlaws slavery] by appropriate legislation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIII, § 2.  That is, to be a legitimate exercise of Congress’ authority under Section Two of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 must have been rights 
that were encompassed within the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.  In other words, Section 
One of the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws not only physical slavery (confinement on plantations 
and involuntary servitude) but all of the “badges and incidents” of slavery that prevent African 
Americans from enjoying their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.  In the words of 
Senator Trumbull: “That is the liberty to which every citizen is entitled; that is the liberty which 
was intended to be secured by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United 
States, originally and more especially by the Amendment which has recently been adopted [the 
Thirteenth Amendment].”  tenBroek, supra note 195, at 191 (quoting Senator Trumbull) 
(emphasis added). 
  Furthermore, that the Thirteenth Amendment proscribes more than physical confinement 
of African Americans to plantations and involuntary servitude is shown by the Court’s decision in 
Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).  In Jones, the Court held that 42 U.S.C § 1982, which 
proscribes racial discrimination in the sale of real property, was a permissible exercise of 
congressional power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Id. at 440 (noting that § 
1982 is an updated version of section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).  Therefore, the Court 
held that the refusal to sell a home to an African American was an impermissible “badge and 
incident of slavery.”  Id. at 441. 
  The importance of Jones is that the Court recognized that an act of racial discrimination 
against an African American was a “badge and incident of slavery,” despite the fact that the racial 
discrimination did not physically confine the African American to a plantation or otherwise 
subject him to involuntary servitude.  Id.  Although in Jones, the issue in question was whether 
the racial discrimination was a violation of § 1982, which proscribes racial discrimination in the 
sale of real property, Jones is significant because Congress enacted § 1982 under the authority of 
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Therefore, a logical conclusion from Jones is that 
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment, in addition to outlawing physical confinement to 
slave plantations and involuntary servitude, must also outlaw racial discrimination against 
African Americans at least as it relates to the sale of real property; otherwise, Congress would not 
have had the authority under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment to enact § 1982. 
  After Jones, the next conclusion that the Court will have to make is to hold that Section 
One of the Thirteenth Amendment itself outlaws racial discrimination (as a “badge and incident” 
of slavery) against African Americans and other minorities when the discrimination inhibits such 
minorities’ rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  Along these lines, racial 
discrimination in the health care industry, which some believe causes approximately 60,000 
deaths of African Americans each year, most definitely denies liberty and life to many African 
Americans. 
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African Americans that treated them differently than white people because of 
their alleged inferiority.206 
Subsequent to the Civil Rights Cases, the Court has not decided whether 
the Thirteenth Amendment itself outlaws “badges and incidents of slavery.”  
For example, in Jones v. Mayer,207 the Court, holding that Congress had the 
authority under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment to define and 
outlaw “badges and incidents of slavery,” did not decide whether the 
Thirteenth Amendment by itself outlaws “badges and incident of slavery.”208  
Similarly, in Memphis v. Greene,209 without holding that the Thirteenth 
Amendment itself outlaws “badges and incidents of slavery,” the Court held 
that a city’s closing of a street through a white neighborhood was not a 
 
 206. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 36 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Regarding the 
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice Harlan stated: 
  The thirteenth amendment, my brethren concede, did something more than to 
prohibit slavery as an institution, resting upon distinctions of race, and upheld by positive 
law.  They admit that it established and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the 
United States . . . . 
. . . . 
  But I do hold that since slavery, as the court has repeatedly declared, was the 
moving or principal cause of the adoption of that amendment, and since that institution 
rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their freedom 
necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination against 
them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other 
races . . . . 
. . . . 
  What has been said is sufficient to show that power of congress under the thirteenth 
amendment is not necessarily restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution 
upheld by positive law, but may be exerted to the extent at least of protecting the race, so 
liberated, against discrimination, in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen, where 
such discrimination is based upon race. 
. . . . 
  I am of . . . opinion that such discrimination practised by corporations and 
individuals in the exercise of their public or quasi-public functions is a badge of servitude, 
the imposition of which congress may prevent under its power. 
Id. at 34, 36-37, 43 (emphasis added in second paragraph). 
  Subsequently, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896), Justice Harlan reiterated 
his impressions about the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment: 
The thirteenth amendment does not permit the withholding or the deprivation of any right 
necessarily inhering in freedom.  It not only struck down the institution of slavery as 
previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or 
disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude. 
Id. 
 207. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 208. Id. at 439. 
 209. 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
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sufficient enough inconvenience to African-American drivers to be a “badge 
and incident of slavery.”210 
Future litigation will determine the following issues: first, whether the 
Thirteenth Amendment itself outlaws “badges and incidents of slavery;” 
second, whether “badges and incidents of slavery” include any act of 
intentional racial discrimination against African Americans and other 
minorities that is based upon the black inferiority theory, and that denies 
African Americans and other minorities the same rights that white Americans 
enjoy to engage in their fundamental right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness; and third, whether the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws conduct, 
laws, and practices that have a definite disproportionate impact on African 
Americans and other minorities despite no specific intent to discriminate.  The 
answer to these questions should be “yes” because all racism against African 
Americans in this country, whether intentional or unconscious, stem from the 
same black inferiority theory that supported slavery and post-slavery racial 
discrimination.211 
 
 210. Id. at 128.  The lack of seriousness of the Court’s historical treatment of the Thirteenth 
Amendment is shown by Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).  First, the Court apparently 
entertained the plaintiffs’ direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Id.  In analyzing the 
claim, the Court noted that plaintiffs’ argument was based upon Justice Harlan’s dissenting 
opinion in Plessy, which argued that the Thirteenth Amendment also outlaws the “badges and 
incidents” of slavery, and upon plaintiffs’ assertion that the closing of Jackson, Mississippi’s 
swimming pools to prevent African Americans from swimming in the same pools as white people 
was a “badge and incident” of slavery.  Id. at 226.  In denying the plaintiffs’ claim, the Court 
neither accepted nor rejected the notion that the Thirteenth Amendment itself outlaws “badges 
and incidents” of slavery, but simply held that the closing of the swimming pool was not odious 
enough to violate the Thirteenth Amendment.  Id. at 227.  See also Pittman, supra note 122, at 
848-50.  Arguably, Palmer may mean that there is some level of disproportionate impact that 
might be odious enough to be a “badge and incident” of slavery. 
 211. See Pittman, supra note 122, at 806-07.  Although some readers of this Article might 
lament that the original intent of Congress was not that the Thirteenth Amendment should outlaw 
racial discrimination against African Americans and other minorities, it is reasonably clear that 
there is support in the legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 that some of the proponents and opponents of the amendment and the Act did believe that 
these laws would provide equal protection to African Americans by outlawing unequal treatment 
based upon racial discrimination.  See supra note 205.  In any event, the Court’s current 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment should not be controlled by the Court’s 
understanding regarding the original intent of the enacting Congress.  Rather, when interpreting 
the Thirteenth Amendment, the current Court should engage in a “dynamic interpretation” of the 
Thirteenth Amendment that construes it in light of America’s articulated policy against racial 
discrimination and the devastating effects that present-day racial discrimination has on African 
Americans and other minorities.  Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based 
Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 
2359-62 (2002).  Professor Eskridge makes the following observations regarding the Court’s 
dynamic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown v. Board of Education and of its 
dynamic interpretation of other constitutional provisions in other landmark decisions: 
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  It does not appear that any Justice was persuaded that the framers or ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, on balance, “intended” to render public school segregation 
constitutionally problematic, and the amendment was not so interpreted in the nineteenth 
century.  In the teeth of historical evidence that educational apartheid was not the object 
of the Equal Protection Clause, versus moral and social science evidence that such a 
policy had malignant consequences, the Warren Court emphatically chose the latter and 
dished off 100 years of history in a couple of sentences.  Handed down the same day, 
Bolling interpreted the Fifth Amendment to bar school segregation in the District of 
Columbia, a result that would never have occurred to the framers of either that 
amendment (1791) or the Fourteenth (1868).  Appropriately, Chief Justice Warren’s 
opinion in Bolling made no mention of original intent. 
  Brown and Bolling were a watershed.  Not only were the briefs strongly presentist in 
orientation, but the Court’s opinions were exclusively so.  That the Court’s greatest and 
most legitimate constitutional decisions were rendered with no originalist support—and 
wide belief that original intent supported Plessy—called forth a generation of relatively 
open constitutional dynamism.  An important academic defense of the Living Constitution 
was penned by then- closeted gay Professor Charles Reich: “[I]n a dynamic society,” the 
Constitution “must keep changing in its application or lose even its original meaning. 
There is no such thing as a constitutional provision with a static meaning. If it stays the 
same while other provisions of the Constitution change and society itself changes, the 
provision will atrophy.” After Supreme Court Justices had signaled that they were a ready 
audience for these arguments, attorneys for people of color, women, and gay people urged 
the courts in case after case to update the Constitution to protect them from state 
oppression and to give teeth to their claims of equal citizenship.  Not surprisingly, most of 
the Court’s landmark individual rights decisions since Brown have ignored original 
expectations or any meaningful explication of pre-civil rights constitutional history as a 
basis for their holding.  Instead, these decisions have been justified by what general 
constitutional principles or purposes would seem to require under present social 
circumstances.  Or they have been justified by reference to precedents that themselves 
updated the Constitution through a present-minded purposivism.  These kinds of 
arguments have been a common feature of Supreme Court decisions selectively 
incorporating various Bill of Rights provisions into the Due Process Clause (such as 
Gideon . . .); applying the Due Process Clause to strike down vague statutes (such as 
Papachristou . . .); recognizing a right of sexual privacy (such as Griswold and Roe . . .); 
sweeping away laws barring sexual and marital relations between people of different races 
(Loving . . .); subjecting sex-based classifications (such as Craig . . .) and affirmative 
action programs (such as Adarand . . .) to heightened scrutiny; striking down obsolescent 
death penalty laws (such as Furman and Coker . . .); examining state voting restrictions 
under strict scrutiny (such as the one-person, one vote cases . . .); expanding Congress’s 
power to reach discriminatory conduct . . . and state responsibility for discriminatory acts 
of private parties (such as the sit-in cases . . .); and protecting people’s expressive conduct 
and association against state censorship (such as the NAACP and Boy Scout cases . . .). 
Id. at 2359-61 (footnotes omitted). 
  Other scholars have recognized that, when interpreting the Constitution, the Court often 
engages in a dynamic interpretation of constitutional provisions by taking current social and 
political mores into consideration.  Joachim Hermann, The Death Penalty in Japan: An “Absurd” 
Punishment, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 841 (2002).  Regarding the Court’s belief that the use of the 
death penalty for persons under fifteen years of age would be contrary to the “social consensus” 
of decency, the author asserted, “[t]he ‘social consensus’ argument must, therefore, be taken as 
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another example of the Supreme Court’s dynamic interpretation of the American Constitution 
rather than as a description of the social reality in America.”  Id.; see also Carol S. Steiker, 
Second Thoughts About First Principle, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 825-26 (1994).  Steiker noted: 
My argument depends on the acceptance of some version of constitutional dynamism—
the principle that interpretations of the Constitution will and should change over time to 
accommodate the needs of different historical ages.  Very few scholars attempt to defend 
a principle of complete constitutional stasis, by which the Constitution in all of its current 
applications is to be read exactly as the Framers would have read it, to the best of our 
reconstruction. 
Steiker, supra, at 825-26 (footnotes omitted). 
  The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), is an excellent 
example of the Court’s use of a dynamic interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to hold that Texas’ prosecution of two adult males for engaging in 
homosexual anal intercourse was a violation of the males’ liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause.  See id. at 2483-84.  Therefore, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), which held that the same Due Process Clause did not protect homosexual conduct.  
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478, 2483-84.  The Lawrence Court noted that the history of states’ 
proscription and prosecution of same-sex intercourse between adults was not as clear as the 
Bowers Court had believed, and that only a small number of states prosecuted adults for such 
conduct.  See id. at 2478-82.  The Lawrence Court further noted that in some foreign countries, 
the governments do not prosecute adults for engaging in homosexual conduct.  See id. at 2481.  
Additionally, the Court stated that, along with a weak history of states’ prosecutions of same-sex 
homosexual conduct, the Court’s Due Process Clause liberty jurisprudence had undergone a 
change, in part, through the Court’s decisions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), such that both married and 
unmarried persons have more liberty interest rights to make “intimate and personal choices” 
involving “one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”  Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
  Therefore, the Court recognized that there was “an emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.” Id. at 2474.  Acknowledging that emerging awareness, the Court overruled 
Bowers, relying upon its decisions in Casey and Romer and considering that “[i]n the United 
States, criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in 
all respects . . . .”  Id. at 2474, 2483-84. 
  It is unequivocally clear that the Court’s decision in Lawrence was based upon the 
Court’s dynamic interpretation of the Due Process Clause and of its impact on homosexual 
conduct.  This conclusion is especially true given that the Court gave weight to the current 
societal attitudes toward homosexual conduct, including the fact that most states do not enforce 
laws prohibiting such conduct.  That the Court engaged in a dynamic interpretation is shown by 
its statement that: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, 
they might have been more specific.  They did not presume to have this insight.  They 
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom. 
Id. at 2484. 
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Everyone should know that white Americans enslaved African Americans 
because they were deemed inferior to white people.  Furthermore, everyone 
should know that after slavery, white people continued to discriminate against 
African Americans on the grounds that they were allegedly inferior and not 
worthy of the same rights, privileges and freedom that white people enjoyed.212  
This discrimination by white people against African Americans continued in a 
de jure manner for approximately one hundred years after the Civil War and 
African Americans’ emancipation.  The discrimination did not abate until 
federal laws, and sometimes federal troops, forced integration upon white 
people during the 1960s.213  Despite the presence of civil rights laws, however, 
many white people have continued and will in the future continue their racial 
discrimination through various overt and covert schemes, as shown by the 
many lawsuits involving racial discrimination that are discussed in the federal 
 
  Similarly, the Court should employ a dynamic interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to allow a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment as envisioned in this 
Article.  As footnote 205 shows, there is legislative history that the drafters of the Amendment 
and of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as many of the opponents of those enactments, 
believed that the Amendment also outlawed the “badges and incidents” of slavery, including any 
racial discrimination based upon an alleged racial inferiority that denies African Americans, and 
other minorities, equal protection of the laws and their rights to life, liberty, and happiness in 
pursuit of the same opportunities that white people have.  See supra note 205 and accompanying 
text.  To the extent that that legislative history is ambiguous, the Court should refuse to give it 
overwhelming weight to the same extent that the Court would not rely upon broad statements 
about how homosexual conduct was broadly frowned upon at the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and for many years following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Instead, 
the Court should interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, in the tradition of Justice Harlan’s dissents 
in the Civil Rights Cases and in Plessy, by acknowledging that racism based upon the black 
inferiority theory was the foundation of slavery and all subsequent acts of racial discrimination.  
The Court should also consider that private parties commit a substantial amount of current racial 
discrimination without being subject to a Fourteenth Amendment claim because of the state 
action requirement.  Such private discrimination includes the health care discrimination that is 
discussed throughout this Article.  Additionally, the Court should acknowledge that the current 
societal norm is that racial discrimination is against the public policy of this country.  Finally, the 
Court should recognize that the Thirteenth Amendment is the only remaining constitutional 
amendment that proscribes acts of private discrimination.  Given these considerations, the Court 
should construe the Thirteenth Amendment such that the Court holds that the Amendment itself 
outlaws “badges and incidents” of slavery and that “badges and incidents” of slavery include any 
act of racial discrimination based upon the black inferiority theory that either denies one the equal 
protection of the laws or that denies one the same right to life, liberty and happiness that white 
people enjoy. 
 212. See generally 2 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 117 (discussing the racist practices of 
physicians). 
 213. See generally King & Wolf, supra note 75 (discussing the racist practices of physicians 
and how they somewhat abated during the 1960s after the passage of civil rights laws). 
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reporters and that are now pending before federal civil rights enforcement 
agencies.214 
In the health care industry, the continuation of racial discrimination 
manifests itself in the racial disparities in medical treatments that are the 
subject of this Article.  These racial disparities in medical treatments against 
African Americans stem from African Americans’ alleged status as an inferior 
race, which is the only conclusion that makes any sense.215  This same black 
inferiority theory was the foundation upon which slavery was built.216  The 
theory has supported all subsequent acts of racial discrimination against 
African Americans.217  Therefore, one should not have to make a giant leap to 
conclude that the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws any form of racial 
discrimination that relegates African Americans to an inferior status by 
denying them the same freedoms that white people enjoy.  This conclusion is 
the essence of Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinions in the Civil Rights Cases 
and in Plessy v. Ferguson.218 
Because slavery and racial discrimination in this country were and are 
based upon the lie that African Americans and other minorities were and are 
inherently inferior, and because the Court has already held that the Thirteenth 
Amendment sought to confer on African Americans the same universal 
freedom that white people enjoy,219 the Thirteenth Amendment, of necessity, 
must also outlaw the “badges and incidents” of slavery.  To hold otherwise 
would mean that Congress intended that white Americans should continue to 
use the black inferiority theory to oppress African Americans even after they 
were freed from slavery.  There is no definitive reason to believe that the 
 
 214. See Wade, supra note 115, at 395.  One commentator stated: 
“[A]s minorities gain entry to the companies that once spurned them, charges of racial 
harassment on the job have almost doubled, to 6,249 [in 1999] from 3,272 in 1990. . . . 
The acts cited ranged from slurs to nooses hung in doorways.”  “The number of victims 
receiving payouts from employers has tripled, to 1,750 [in 2000] from 513 in 1998.”  Two 
glaring examples of the costliness of inadequate corporate responses to racial 
discrimination grievances are the $176 million settlement of the Texaco litigation in 1996, 
and Coca-Cola’s $192.5 million settlement in 2000. 
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
  In addition to the employment discrimination that is discussed in this footnote, the 
discussion in Part II of this Article shows that there are also many acts of racial discrimination 
that occur today in the health care industry. 
 215. See generally 2 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 117 (discussing society’s and physicians’ 
belief that African Americans were intellectually inferior to white people). 
 216. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 217. See generally HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 92 (discussing the development and 
progression of the black inferiority theory from one generation to the next). 
 218. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 219. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  “By its own 
unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom . . . . They admit 
that it established and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the United States.”  Id. at 34. 
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Congress that enacted the Thirteenth Amendment intended such a result.  
Federal courts should allow a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment to 
remedy conduct that has a disparate impact on African Americans and conduct 
that intentionally discriminates against them.220 
3. The Scope and Impact of a Thirteenth Amendment Claim 
Assuming that the Supreme Court does recognize a direct claim under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, what standards must parties to such a lawsuit meet to 
establish the claim?  Elsewhere, this author has argued that the Court should 
incorporate the strict scrutiny standard that it established in City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co.:221 
  Adopting Croson’s strict scrutiny standard in the Thirteenth Amendment 
context would require that, in response to a plaintiff’s direct claim of 
intentional racial discrimination or a plaintiff’s prima facie disproportionate 
impact discrimination claim, a defendant (either a state, private person, or 
private entity) show that: (1) the challenged practice serves a compelling state 
or legitimate private interest, (2) the challenged practice is narrowly tailored to 
the achievement of the asserted interest, and (3) there are no less restrictive 
alternatives to achieve the asserted interest.222 
This Article will add further clarification and contours to the Thirteenth 
Amendment claim. 
a. Intentional Discrimination Claims 
An intentional discrimination claim is one where a plaintiff alleges that a 
physician or other health care provider has intentionally discriminated against 
an African American or other minority when providing medical treatment.  For 
example, assume that a medical provider believes that he or she should 
discriminate against African-American patients, when deciding whether to 
recommend the patients for a kidney transplant, because of a shortage of 
available kidneys.  Applying the above-referenced test, a patient should be able 
to establish her claim by showing that such a physician cannot satisfy this 
three-part test.  The failure to satisfy the first part of the test would be because 
a physician’s racial discrimination against an African-American patient is 
neither a legitimate private interest nor a legitimate state interest given this 
country’s policy against racial discrimination as announced in the Thirteenth, 
 
 220. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 221. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 222. Pittman, supra note 122, at 882.  When a private party is involved, the defendant will 
have to show a “legitimate private interest,” which is any interest that is not illegal because such a 
definition would be most in line with the defendant having the fullest opportunity to pursue his or 
her life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.  See id. at 882 n.412. 
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Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and in numerous civil rights laws 
including Title VI.223 
Second, it is doubtful that a physician’s explicit use of race to ration 
kidneys would satisfy the “narrowly tailored” requirement because any 
rationing criteria that discriminate against a particular race because of skin 
color and notions of black inferiority are not “narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of the asserted interest” of rationing organs and other medical 
treatments.224  Even if the asserted interests (conserving human organs, 
medical treatments, and physicians’ work schedules) were legitimate, a 
physician’s disseminating of medical products and treatments by racial criteria 
is illogical and irrational for patients who are similarly situated with the same 
health conditions.  Criteria based upon racial discrimination, an illegal social 
construct, are against the articulated public policy of this country.  Therefore, 
any other legitimate criteria for the dissemination of human organs and 
medical treatments would be more narrowly tailored than any racial criteria.  
As such, generally, a physician who intentionally uses racial criteria will not be 
able to satisfy the second part of the above-referenced test. 
Similarly, medical providers who use racial criteria that lead to African 
Americans and other minorities being given less of or a different type of 
treatments than similarly-situated white patients should not frequently satisfy 
the third part of the test—“no less restrictive alternatives to achieve the 
asserted interest”—because such discrimination would be blatant racism.  This 
 
 223. Rationing of organs and other medical treatments might be a legitimate public or private 
interest if there are not enough kidneys to meet the public demand.  Some means, including 
rationing, might be necessary to ensure that a kidney or other organ is put to its best possible use.  
The same might be true regarding other medical treatments.  Therefore, a defendant could 
conceivably establish the first part of the above-referenced three-part test. 
  However, a public policy regarding the rationing of organ transplants should be based 
upon criteria that do not discriminate against either African Americans or other races.  Hopefully, 
the criteria will be such that recipients are either randomly selected or selected based upon real 
and legitimate race-neutral factors that do not have a disparate impact on any group. 
  The same analysis and conclusions should apply to other medical treatments, including 
heart catheterization and other medical procedures for which there is presently a racial disparity 
between African-American patients and white patients.  To the extent that there is no federal 
policy or procedure for the disbursement of such treatments (for the most part there will not be), 
and physicians and other medical providers are in charge of providing such treatments, these 
providers should give medical treatments on either a non-discriminatory basis or refer patients to 
those medical providers who will give the treatment in a responsible and equitable manner 
without racial discrimination against African Americans and other patients. 
  Regarding referrals to other physicians, it is to be understood that some physicians might 
ration medical care for their own financial self-interest.  That is, a surgeon who can physically 
perform only a certain number of heart catheterization or other cardiac procedures might not be 
willing to refer patients to another physician because the surgeon can still make some income by 
keeping the patient and by performing conservative treatments on the patient. 
 224. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
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conclusion is warranted because it is not legitimate to favor white patients over 
African-American and other minority patients; only non-racial criteria should 
be permissible in a country that professes a commitment to racial equality.  
Therefore, as stated above, any set of non-racial criteria likely would be less 
restrictive than racial criteria. 
In sum, when a patient proves that her medical provider is guilty of 
intentional racial discrimination because the provider intentionally gave the 
patient less of or a different type of treatment than the provider gave similarly-
situated white patients in the same medical condition, the patient will have 
established a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment because a 
physician will generally not be able to satisfy the three-part test.  However, 
given sophisticated medical providers’ covert discrimination, the complicated 
nature of medicine, and patients’ general lack of knowledge about their 
medical treatments, many minority patients should consider a disproportionate 
impact theory of racial discrimination filed directly under the Thirteenth 
Amendment instead of an intentional discrimination claim. 
b. Disproportionate Impact Claim 
The above-discussed three-part test also would be applicable to a 
disproportionate impact claim under the Thirteenth Amendment, but the 
disproportionate impact claim would require a further discussion of this test 
that takes into consideration that medical providers generally have more 
knowledge than their patients about why a patient did not choose or was not 
offered a certain treatment that providers have disproportionately given to their 
white patients.  Given medical providers’ superior knowledge, a patient who 
brings a disproportionate impact claim under the Thirteenth Amendment 
should be required to meet the following burden of proof: first, the patient 
must show that her medical provider did not give her a type of treatment that 
the provider gave to white patients who were in substantially the same medical 
condition, and second, that in providing a different treatment to African-
American and other minority patients, the medical provider caused a racial 
disparity in the use of the treatments in that he gave minority patients less of a 
treatment than he gave white patients, even when the minority patients’ 
medical conditions were substantially the same as white patients’ medical 
conditions.225  These two factors or elements are the patient’s prima facie case, 
 
 225. Also, as a general principle of civil procedure and civil lawsuits, the burden of 
production and persuasion are frequently placed on the party who either has or should have the 
most information regarding a particular issue.  See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) 
(discussing that a defendant in a § 1983 case has the burden of persuasion on her good faith 
defense because, in part, she has access to more information regarding good faith).  It seems only 
reasonable that after a plaintiff has met the requirements necessary to prove her prima facie case 
(i.e., she has shown that her physician did not give her a treatment that the physician gave to 
white patients and that there is a racial disparity in the physician’s allocation of the treatment), the 
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and they should be sufficient to shift the burden of proof to a defendant 
medical provider. 
The medical provider must then establish the above-referenced three-part 
test that: “(1) the challenged practice serves a compelling state or legitimate 
private interest, (2) the challenged practice is narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of the asserted interest, and (3) there are no less restrictive 
alternatives to achieve the asserted interest.”226 
In the context of normal medical treatments, an evaluation of a physician’s 
or other medical provider’s treatment under the three-part test might be more 
narrowly focused than would be the analysis of other types of discrimination 
challenged under a direct Thirteenth Amendment claim.  For the first part of 
the test, in the medical treatment context, the only “legitimate private interest” 
or state interest that a Court should recognize is the interest of providing 
medically necessary treatment consistent with the prevailing standard of 
care.227  Physicians’ and other medical providers’ rationing of medical care by 
using racial criteria is not a legitimate state or private interest.228 
 
physician should have the burden of production and persuasion on the factors at issue in the 
above-referenced three-part test. 
 226. See supra text accompanying note 222. 
 227. To provide any treatment to a patient other than medically necessary treatment would be 
against the physician’s fiduciary obligations to treat a patient pursuant to the patient’s own best 
medical interests, without the physician’s own self-interests influencing her treatment of the 
patient.  See generally Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).  A 
physician who secretly allows his or her financial or other interests to influence his or her 
treatment of a patient runs the risk of being guilty of an informed consent violation.  See id. 
  It should be noted that the medical standard of practice is a range of treatments, such as 
options A, B, or C in the kidney transplant process  (see supra note 39 and accompanying text) 
each of which satisfies the standard of care.  FURROW ET AL., supra note 42, at 172.  “Substantial 
regional variations exist in the use of many procedures, with no apparent differences in 
outcome . . . .”  Id.  However, to the extent that treatment option C is deemed to be better than 
option A, physicians should not give more of option C to white people than to African Americans 
and other minorities.  In choosing among the different treatment options, physicians should use 
non-racial criteria. 
  To the extent that their alleged race-neutral criteria have a racially disproportionate 
impact on African Americans and other minorities, physicians (and other challenged medical 
providers) should have the burden of production and persuasion of offering a non-pretextual 
reason for the racial disparity, one that is consistent with the obligations that the three-part test, as 
discussed in the text of this Article, imposes.  Similarly, because a physician’s or other medical 
provider’s fiduciary duty mandates that such provider treat the individual patient without 
allowing other patients’ health status or concerns to influence the individual patient’s medical 
treatment, physicians and other medical providers should not allow any ideas that they might 
have about rationing medial care to African Americans, to other minorities, and to white patients 
to influence the providers’ medical judgment about the particular type of medical treatment that 
should be given to a particular African-American patient, or to any other type of patient.  In other 
words, physicians should provide treatment according to the prevailing standard of medical 
practice.  When physicians give either the treatment that the standard of practice requires or when 
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Regarding the first part of the three-part test, if the defendant physician or 
other medical provider asserts that “the challenged practice” (giving a different 
type of treatment to African Americans than to white Americans) serves a 
legitimate private interest or state interest, the physician or other provider can 
meet his burden of production and persuasion only by showing that the 
disparate treatment was medically necessary either because some aspect of the 
patient’s medical condition warranted a different treatment than what the 
physician disproportionately gave to his white patients or because the patient, 
after the physician gave her appropriate informed consent disclosure, refused 
the specific type of treatment that white patients disproportionately chose to 
accept.229 
For the second part of the above-referenced test—whether the treatment 
that caused the racial disparity is “narrowly tailored” to achieve the only 
legitimate interest of providing medically necessary treatment to the patient—a 
defendant physician or other medical provider cannot satisfy this standard 
unless the provider can show that there was no other treatment (that would not 
have led to a racial disparity in medical treatment or health outcomes) that the 
patient would have accepted and that would have been just as efficacious as the 
treatment that the physician did provide.230  In other words, the medical 
provider should not be allowed to establish this part of the test if the patient 
would have chosen the type of treatment that the provider disproportionately 
provided to his white patients had the medical provider informed her of the 
existence and availability of the treatment. 
Regarding the third part of the test, if the patient would have accepted the 
treatment that the medical provider disproportionately provided to his white 
patients, then there would be a less restrictive alternative, namely the treatment 
that the medical provider gave to the white patients.231  In the final analysis, 
 
they give more treatment than the standard of care requires, they should give the treatment in a 
non-discriminatory manner without any preference for one race of patients over another race of 
patients. 
 228. The same is true for medical treatments that have a disproportionate impact on African 
Americans and other minorities. 
 229. The trial court and subsequent appellate courts could then scrutinize the physicians’ and 
other medical providers’ explanations for the disparity in treatment.  Consistent with normal rules 
of civil procedure, the burden of persuasion is met only when a rational jury could find for the 
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence that the racial disparity in treatment was medically 
necessary because of the patient’s medical condition or that the patient, after the physician gave 
appropriate informed consent disclosures, refused the treatment that the physician 
disproportionately gave to white patients. 
 230. Normally, the denied treatment would be more effective given that white patients 
received it when African-Americans did not. 
 231. If the patient would not have accepted that treatment (after appropriate informed consent 
disclosures), the physician should still be required to show, in order to meet this part of the three-
part test, that there were no other alternative treatments that the patient would have accepted that 
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the bottom line of the defendant provider’s burden of production and 
persuasion is that the provider must offer some evidence that the medical 
treatments disproportionately given to white patients were either not medically 
appropriate for the minority patient or that the minority patient refused the 
treatment after the physician gave appropriate informed consent disclosures.232 
The above analysis, with its discussion of the three-part test and the 
shifting of the burden of production and persuasion, is applicable to a patient’s 
claim that a medical provider violated the Thirteenth Amendment when the 
provider did not give the same type of medically appropriate treatment to the 
African-American patient or other minority patients as he gave to white 
patients.233  This direct Thirteenth Amendment claim is applicable to claims 
that medical providers did not provide organ transplants and other needed 
medical procedures, including, but not limited to, such treatments as invasive 
heart surgery.  Additionally, the claim should apply when a minority patient 
alleges that a physician or other medical provider did not give the patient 
appropriate informed consent disclosures regarding the patient’s options for 
medical treatments. 
V.  A NEW APPROACH TO INFORMED CONSENT 
Presently, to satisfy their pre-treatment informed consent disclosure 
obligations, physicians must inform their patients of the risks and benefits 
involved in the recommended treatment, in alternative treatments, and in no 
treatment.234  A majority of the states still have a physician-oriented standard 
of informed consent whereby a physician must give only those risk disclosures 
 
would not have led to a racial disparity in medical treatment between African-American patients 
and white patients.  Implicit in this notion is medical providers’ proof that there is no other 
treatment that they could have given that would have been as effective as the treatment that they 
gave to the African-American patient and that the patient would have chosen.  Physicians can 
establish this lack of availability of alternative treatments only if they can show that their 
informed consent disclosures were complete and that the patient herself chose the given 
treatment. 
 232. As argued below, even when the treatment that the physician gave to the white patients 
was allegedly not medically acceptable or indicated for the African-American patient, the court 
should still impose an obligation on the treating physician to disclose to the African-American 
patient the nature of the alleged inappropriate treatment that the physician gave to white patients, 
the risks involved in the treatment, and the reasons why the treatment is inappropriate.  See infra 
Part V. 
 233. The same test should apply to patients’ claims under the Thirteenth Amendment against 
physicians regardless of the race or ethnicity of the treating physician.  See supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
 234. FURROW ET AL., supra note 42, at 356-58.  Not only must physicians give informed 
consent disclosures to patients who are seeking medical treatments, physicians and other medical 
researchers must disclose risk information to patients who are subjects of human experiments and 
other types of medical research.  See generally Dana Ziker, Reviving Informed Consent: Using 
Risk Perception in Clinical Trials, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15 (2003). 
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that are warranted by the prevailing standard of medical practice.235  This 
approach can promote a paternalistic standard of medicine because physicians 
determine the standard of medical practice regarding how much risk disclosure 
information they must give to their patients. 
On the other hand, a slight minority of states has adopted a patient-oriented 
standard that requires physicians to disclose those risks that would be material 
to a reasonably prudent patient under the same circumstances.236  The patient-
oriented standard is less paternalistic because the focus is on mandating that 
physicians and other medical providers disclose material information so that 
patients can use the information when making decisions about their treatment 
options—decisions that are consistent with patients’ liberty interests in making 
self-determined decisions about their medical treatments.237  As such, the 
patient-oriented standard is more in line with a patient’s due process liberty 
interest in deciding whether to submit to medical treatments.238 
Considering these notions of patient autonomy, courts and the medical 
profession should refocus the informed consent doctrine towards an eradication 
of the current racial disparities in medical treatment.  The present informed 
consent disclosure requirement that physicians must disclose the risks of 
alternative treatments is ripe for this refocusing.  First, as medical treatments 
generally fall along a spectrum of treatments, where a physician can prescribe 
several different types of treatments for a given medical condition, physicians 
should already be informing their minority patients of the specific type of 
treatments that they are disproportionately giving to white patients.239  Such an 
obligation is nothing more than the generally-recognized physician’s duty to 
disclose the risks and benefits of alternative treatments to her patients.  
 
 235. FURROW ET AL., supra note 42, at 355.  See generally James A. Bulen, Jr., 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Ethical and Legal Aspects of Informed Consent to 
Treatment, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 331 (2003) (discussing the two approaches to informed consent 
and stating that the patient-oriented standard is the best approach). 
 236. Unlike in a physician-oriented jurisdiction, no expert testimony is needed to support an 
assertion that a certain risk was material because a reasonably prudent jury can decide which risks 
are material to a reasonably prudent patient.  See id. at 356. 
 237. A patient’s ability to make informed decisions about the types of medical treatments that 
she will receive is the ultimate expression of a patient’s constitutional and common law rights to 
determine what shall be done to or with her body.  Cf. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990) (assuming that a competent adult has a liberty interest in refusing medical treatment). 
 238. Presently, this author favors the patient-oriented standard for the reasons discussed in the 
text; however, regardless of whether a state adheres to the physician-oriented standard or the 
patient-oriented standard, the changes in the informed consent disclosures that this Article 
proposes should be made.  The law and policies surrounding the informed consent doctrine is 
extensive.  See generally RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT (1986). 
 239. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 42, at 356-58 (discussing the types of risk disclosures 
that physicians should make to their patients, including the risks of alternative treatments). 
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Therefore, to the extent that physicians are not disclosing the benefits and risks 
of treatments that they disproportionately give to their white patients, they are 
already guilty of an informed consent violation that is actionable in a civil 
lawsuit under the generally-recognized negligence cause of action for failure to 
provide informed consent disclosures.240 
It is not unreasonable to believe that many physicians are not giving 
sufficient disclosures about the risks and benefits of the types of treatments 
that they are disproportionately offering to their white patients.241  Therefore, 
to make physicians’ informed consent disclosure obligations more definite in 
the present environment of rampant racial disparities in medical treatments, the 
informed consent law should be refined to specifically impose the obligation 
that physicians do three additional things before providing medical treatment: 
(1) inform their minority patients that there is a racial disparity between them 
and white patients regarding the types of treatments that the physician 
disproportionately provides to white patients; (2) explain the specific reasons 
why there is a disparity in the treatments among the different races of patients, 
and (3) explain the specific risks and benefits of the treatments, including, but 
not limited to, the risks and benefits of the specific treatments that the 
physician is recommending to minority patients and the specific risks and 
benefits of the treatments that the physician disproportionately recommends 
and gives to his or her white patients. 
 
 240. See id.  The informed consent disclosures will be even more important as the medical 
profession enters such high tech areas as genetic engineering.  See Harold J. Bursztajn et al., 
Protecting Privacy in the Behavioral Genetics Era, 27 MENTAL & PHYS. DISABILITY L. REP. 523 
(2003); Lori Andrews & Erin Shaughnessy, Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues in Genetic Testing 
For Complex Genetic Diseases, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (2003).  A patient’s informed consent, 
and the steps that physicians must take to ensure that they give sufficient information about the 
risks of medical treatment options, is important and a waiver of a physician’s duty to give such 
information should be scrutinized.  See generally Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 281 (2003). 
 241. Despite the fact that the general duty to disclose the risks and benefits of alternative 
treatments appears to be clear enough to inform physicians of their disclosure obligations, 
especially those physicians who act in good faith and with impartiality when they treat their 
patients, the present disparities in medical treatment probably are because some physicians do not 
tell their African-American patients that the denied treatment is available.  As a matter of fact, 
many physicians generally do not properly inform their patients about the risks and benefits of 
their treatment options.  See James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? 
Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 295, 317 (2003).  Despite the importance of informed consent disclosures for a 
patient’s decision-making, many physicians do not disclose material risk information to the 
patient with sufficient clarity to engender a patient’s understanding.  See Peter H. Schuck, 
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 948 (1994) (asserting that “[m]any physicians 
discuss risk in more or less perfunctory manner and without much regard to how well the patient 
comprehends the information.  Many patients appear to understand little of the risk information 
and, shortly after the discussion, to recall even less.”). 
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Consistent with this Article’s argument for a direct claim under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the above-recommended changes in the informed 
consent doctrine are mandated by the Thirteenth Amendment.  The proposed 
changes are required because the Thirteenth Amendment—as defined by 
Justice Harlan’s dissents in the Civil Rights Cases and in Plessy, and as 
supported by this Article’s arguments—outlaws, as “badges and incidents” of 
slavery, any racial discrimination against African-American patients and other 
minority patients that is based upon the black inferiority theory. 
Clearly, any physician who recommends and provides treatments to white 
patients that he or she does not recommend and provide to medically-qualified 
African Americans and other minorities is practicing medicine pursuant to 
some version of the black inferiority theory.242  This conclusion is appropriate 
because there is no non-racial reason for a physician’s refusal to give his or her 
minority patients the same disclosures of specific risks and benefits of 
proposed and alternative treatments that the physician gives to his or her white 
patients.  The primary benefit of the proposed additions to the informed 
consent requirement is that they would give patients the information needed to 
ask further questions about their medical treatments and to consider the various 
options for such treatments.243  This additional information might lead to the 
patient’s acceptance of the treatments that physicians disproportionately make 
available to white patients.  Importantly, the proposed additional disclosures 
would provide patients with the knowledge that they need to seek a second 
opinion from another physician who might be more willing to recommend and 
provide the treatments that physicians disproportionately give to white 
patients. 
In sum, the Thirteenth Amendment is implicated and violated by a 
physician’s failure to give the proposed additional informed consent 
disclosures.  At the very least, a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment 
is appropriate.  Further, upon a patient’s showing of a racial disparity in 
medical treatment, the burdens of production and persuasion should shift to the 
defendant medical provider to offer an explanation for the racial disparity in 
 
 242. This conclusion is appropriate because there is no legitimate reason for a physician to 
provide a different treatment to an African-American patient, who can pay for the same treatment 
that the physician gives to white patients, unless the patient is not a candidate for the treatment 
under the prevailing standard of care or unless she refuses the treatment after the physician’s 
appropriate risks and benefits disclosures. 
 243. The proposed changes to the informed consent requirement should not impose a duty 
upon patients to ask for relevant risk and benefit disclosures, given that physicians have an 
affirmative duty to provide such information even if the patient does not ask for it.  See generally 
Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980) (discussing physicians’ duty to disclose certain 
information even if the patient does not ask for it).  However, the proposed changes would merely 
provide a means by which the patient would have more information to discuss her treatment 
option as a means of self-protection in the event that a treating physician is inclined toward racial 
discrimination against the patient. 
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medical treatment consistent with the above-referenced three-part test, 
including a discussion of why African-American patients and other minority 
patients did not receive the same informed consent risk disclosures that white 
patients received.244 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although this Article discusses many different aspects of the racial 
disparities in medical treatment, the fundamental issue that it presents is 
whether this country will ever recognize the worth of African Americans and 
other minorities.  The current racial disparities, and the concomitant increase in 
African Americans’ morbidity and mortality, cry out for explanations.  Given 
that physicians are in control of the informed consent disclosures and of other 
discussions during their treatment of patients, it is reasonable that courts 
should recognize a presumption in favor of impermissible racial discrimination 
when an African-American patient, or other minority patient, can show a racial 
disparity regarding her medical treatment in that her physicians gave white 
patients medical treatments that the physician did not offer to the minority 
patient.  Such a presumption is warranted in light of the persistent racism that 
has existed in the medical profession, at least from slavery and undoubtedly 
into the present time.  In furtherance of the presumption of racism, a patient 
should be afforded a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment because 
physicians’ racism, being based upon the black inferiority theory, is a “badge 
and incident” of slavery.  Racial disparities in medical treatment, and thus in 
health outcomes, should be compensable under a direct Thirteenth Amendment 
claim that would give African-American and other minority patients a cause of 
action for a physician’s intentional racial discrimination, his unconscious racial 
discrimination that has a disproportionate impact on minority patients, and his 
failure to obtain a proper informed consent from a minority patient. 
 
 244. The same analysis as for an intentional discrimination claim and a disproportionate 
impact claim (including the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the defendant’s burdens of production 
and persuasion) is applicable to a direct Thirteenth Amendment claim alleging a lack of informed 
consent disclosure for a physician’s failure to give the changes that are proposed in this portion of 
the Article.  See supra text accompanying notes 221-33. 
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